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ABSTRACT 
 
The development of the Aluminum and Paper industry is assessed by A.T. Kearney’s Merger 
Endgame framework. The implications for Norsk Hydro and Norske Skog are also addressed 
along with value creation opportunities for the corresponding stockholders.  
The Merger Endgame framework reveals that up/midstream in the Aluminum industry is 
entering the Balance and Alliance Stage while downstream is deconsolidating. The 
implications for Norsk Hydro are that the ability to cooperate and build joint ventures will be 
increasingly important in up/midstream while the rivalry is likely to increase downstream. 
Norsk Hydro has invested heavily in up/midstream and is well positioned for such a 
development in this business area. However, the company’s expansion in up/midstream and 
the increasing rivalry downstream imply that the management does not have the capacity to 
build top performers within these two business areas which rely on different skills. The 
greatest value creation opportunity is therefore to further demerge downstream operations in 
order to secure operational mobility and responsiveness to shifting market conditions.  
The Merger Endgame framework reveals that the Paper industry has entered the Focus Stage. 
The implication for Norske Skog is that the industry will continue to consolidate but at a 
slower speed. Financial distress and unsustainable prices in Europe are limiting Norske 
Skog’s ability to invest in value creation opportunities or assess acquisition targets on its own. 
Further consolidation in Europe might limit the current overcapacity problem but the Merger 
Endgame framework reveals that the consolidation speed is decreasing. From the perspective 
of the stockholders the greatest value creation opportunity is therefore to sell to liquidate. 
However, Norske Skog is not considered an attractive acquisition target and potential 
acquirers are limited. If neither a partner is found nor a consolidation within the newsprint or 
magazine segments occurs, there is a severe risk of bankruptcy in the future for Norske Skog.  
The Merger Endgame framework’s main strength is its potential to make Porter’s five forces 
analysis more dynamic. The main weakness is the uncertainty regarding the correctness and 
precision of the framework. Further empirical research is needed to evaluate the framework as 
there are several weaknesses in its empirical foundation. 
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2. Introduction 
 
Mergers & Acquisitions1 (M&A) is important in any industry on a global scale. M&A has 
grown tremendously both in number of transactions and total dollar value since the sixties. In 
1967 the total value of all transactions was under 20 billion2, in 1984 it grew to 100 billion, 
and in 2005 it was around 2.7 trillion (Hillier, Grinblatt og Titman, 2008). Since 1992 more 
than thousand transactions have been done each year only in the U.S. alone (Eckbo, 2010).  
The Merger Endgame framework, developed by consulting firm A.T. Kearney, aims to 
predict the consolidation process of any industry. Every industry consolidates on a global 
scale and progresses through four different stages from birth to death in an average of 25 
years (Deans, Kroeger og Zeisel, 2003). As industries continue to consolidate companies must 
consider external growth in order to keep up with domestic and international competitors. 
My purpose in this paper is to assess likely development paths for the Aluminum and Paper 
industries on a global scale using A.T. Kearney’s Merger Endgame framework and also 
identify value creation opportunities for the stockholders of Norsk Hydro and Norske Skog in 
the predicted consolidation process. The framework’s theoretical and empirical foundation as 
well as practical challenges are also discussed. The main results are outlined in the Abstract. 
In general the Merger Endgame framework has the potential to make Porter’s five forces (and 
related frameworks’) analysis more dynamic. My use of the case-examples Norsk Hydro and 
Norske Skog shows that these two frameworks are good supplements and provide a forward-
looking element to the analysis. Nonetheless, there are still uncertainties regarding the 
correctness and precision of the Merger Endgame framework. Further empirical research is 
therefore needed to evaluate the framework and improve its empirical foundation. 
The rest of this paper has the following outline: In the next section A.T. Kearney’s Merger 
Endgame framework’s theoretical and empirical foundation is reviewed and discussed. The 
Aluminum and Paper industries are then analyzed with special focus on the implications for 
Norske Skog and Norsk Hydro. Finally, the framework’s strength and weaknesses in general 
and in these particular cases are discussed. 
                                                           
1
 Mergers & Acquisitions is used as defined by Bettonnes, Eckbo og Thorburn (2008, s. 292); ”we use the term 
… for any acquisition of corporate control through the purchase of the voting stock of the target firm, regardless 
of whetever the bid is in the form of a merger agreement or a tender offer.” 
2
 All figures in this paper are given in U.S. dollars if nothing else is stated. 
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3. A.T. Kearney’s Merger Endgame framework 
In this section A.T. Kearney’s Merger Endgame framework is presented and discussed. This 
section is based on Deans, Kroeger and Zeisel’s Winning the Merger Endgame from 2003. 
3.1 Empirical foundation 
The theoretical and empirical foundation of the Merger Endgame framework is presented in 
this section. Important aspects are the dataset used, parameters and methodology. 
3.1.1 Dataset 
In the development of the Merger Endgame framework two different databases were used. 
The first database, A.T. Kearney’s Value-Building Growth database, includes more than 
25,000 global firms and represents 98 % of world market capitalization. This made it possible 
to analyze the buildup of industry concentration over time. In the purpose of broadening the 
scope of the analysis the empirical results where compared to the Thomson Financial’s SDC 
Platinum Worldwide M&A database that keeps track of more than 135,000 mergers and 
acquisitions. Only those with a transaction value of more than 500 million were used because 
smaller transactions would not be significant in a global context. Moreover, the transactions 
had to involve only publicly traded companies and the acquirer had to have at least 51 % 
interest at the close of the deal. As a result 1,345 transactions by 945 acquiring companies 
were used. All the data taken from these databases were from the time period 1990 to 1999.  
3.1.2 Parameters 
In order to measure industry concentration two different parameters, the Three-firm 
Concentration Ratio (CR3) and the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI), were used. 
The CR3 measures the combined share of industry sales, expressed in percent, held by the 
three largest firms in an industry. Thus, it is a measure of the relative size of an industry’s 
three largest firms. It is given as: 
CR3 = s1 + s2 + s3, 
where s is market share in percent. 
The HHI on the other hand, is the sum of the squared market shares of all the firms in an 
industry. It is given as: 
HHI = s12 + s22 + s32 + s42 + … + sn2, 
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where s is market share in percent and n is the number of firms in the industry. 
As the formulas show, the HHI takes into account both the relative size and distribution of the 
firms in the whole industry, while CR3 only accounts for the size of the three largest firms. As 
a result the HHI increases both as the number of firms in the industry decreases and as the 
disparity in size among the remaining firms increases. In measuring the concentration rate a 
90 % correlation was found between the two different parameters.  
In the calculation of the market shares, s, revenue figures measured in U.S. dollars were used. 
Revenue figures not in U.S. dollars were converted by the year-end exchange rate. 
3.1.3 Methodology 
In order to perform quantitative analyses selected companies from A.T. Kearney’s Value-
Building Growth were ordered after industries defined by the Standard Industry 
Classification. For each industry the average concentration in the time period1995 – 1999 was 
measured by the parameters the CR3 and the HHI. Important industries ranked by the average 
CR3 for 1995 to 1999 are shown in figure 3.1.3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Important industries ranked by the average CR3 for 1995- 1999. 
Next, the average concentration for each industry was measured with the CR3 and the HHI in 
two five-year time frames from 1990 – 1994 and 1995 – 1999. Based on the difference in the 
average concentration degree in these two time frames it was possible to determine if an 
industry is consolidating or deconsolidating. This is also called the direction or speed of 
                                                           
3
 The corresponding HHI ranking is shown in appendix A.1. 
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(de)consolidation. Figure 3.2 shows the value for some selected industries. 
 
Figure 3.2: The level of (de)consolidation for some important industries. 
The similarities between concentration (figure 3.1) and (de)consolidation (figure 3.2) were 
then explored. Some industries tend to be modestly concentrated and deconsolidating, such as 
the railway, telecom, utilities and insurance. While it seems to be a relationship between 
concentration level in 1995 – 1999 and the speed of the consolidation for the other industries, 
except for shoes and soft drinks. By assuming that an industry will develop similar to the next 
industry’s concentration level and keep a constant (de)consolidation speed, one can calculate 
the time it takes to reach the next industry’s consolidation level by using the given 
(de)consolidation speed. Such examples are the railway industry’s deconsolidating speed to 
reach the telecommunication’s less concentrated level and the airline’s given consolidation 
speed to reach the same concentration as drugs. In this way it is possible to get a curve of 
more than 20 years by using only 10 years of historical data.  
3.2 Empirical results 
The result of the empirical study is that the consolidation in any industry on a global scale 
tends to follow a certain predictable s-shaped pattern. The Merger Endgame curve, as the 
pattern is called, is based on two sets of values: the concentration degree on the y-axis and the 
time of (de)consolidation on the x-axis. The Merger Endgame curve is shown in figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.3: The Merger Endgame s-curve (Deans, Kroeger and Zeisel, 2003, p. 6). The HHI is 
logarithmically plotted. Note that the industries plotted on the curve are not up to date. 
The concentration degree on the y-axis is measured by the CR3 and the HHI. The time of 
(de)consolidation on the x-axis is as mentioned retrieved by calculating how much time an 
industry will use to reach the same level of concentration as the next industry, given its 
(de)consolidation speed is held constant. The industries in the first Opening Stage are 
deconsolidating, while industries in the remaining three stages are consolidating until the end 
of the last Balance and Alliance Stage where there is some degree of deconsolidating (for 
example shoes and soft drinks). The Merger Endgame curve spans around 25 years on 
average for any industry with a standard deviation of five years. During these 25 years an 
industry will commence, deconsolidate, consolidate and then dissolve. As shown in figure 3.3 
these 25 years are split into four different stages. By understanding the different characteristic 
of each stage it is possible to predict and develop merger actions and consolidation trends.  
The stages in the Merger Endgame framework have the following characteristics: 
1) The Opening Stage consists of industries that are newly created, spin-offs, and older 
industries that have been recently deregulated. The number of transactions is small and 
the industry’s concentration decreases as newcomers enter.  
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2) The Scale Stage is where the value of scale becomes the important key to success as 
there are no more uncovered market segments within the industry. In other words, the 
strategy shifts from claiming ground to building a corporate powerhouse. As a result 
the industry’s concentration increases through high M&A activity. 
3) The Focus Stage is where some major players dominate. The M&A transactions are 
fewer but bigger in total dollar value as major companies get acquired. In this stage 
scale is not enough and firms focus on finesse such as adjusting cost structure, 
optimizing the value chain and outsourcing non-core businesses to gain flexibility and 
cost advantages. In other words, the focus is more internal than external in this stage. 
The companies that have fallen behind and have not been acquired at this point may be 
forced to choose niches until they become attractive to consolidators, or go bankrupt. 
4) The Balance and Alliance Stage is dominated by very few and large companies that 
are the winners in their industry consolidation race. However, the room to maneuver is 
reduced as external growth is no longer an option. The companies are also often 
subject to government regulation because of their perceived oligopoly or near 
monopoly market position. There are many options at this point in the curve for the 
companies. A common strategy is to grow by pursuing new growth opportunities in 
unrelated industries or by spin-off companies in related industries. The future of the 
industry at this stage is uncertain. Some decline while other find renewed life.  
In order to increase the understanding of industry consolidation A.T. Kearney has performed 
research on corporate population and profitability across the Merger Endgame stages.  
Based on more than 25,000 global firms from the A.T. Kearney’s Value-Building Growth 
database the corporate population across the Merger Endgame stages was examined. An 
industry’s average corporate population, the number of companies in an industry, expands and 
contracts as the industry moves through the four stages, as figure 3.4 shows. The number of 
firms is greatest at the end of stage one due to deregulation. In stage two, however, the 
population contracts nearly 70 % as consolidation begins. In the two final stages, the number 
of companies is reduced even more, only to experience a slight increase at the end of stage 
four due to new entries. This development of corporate population fits with the empirical 
result retrieved by Deans, Kroeger and Zeisel that states that an industry’s position on the 
Merger Endgame curve is strongly correlated with the merger activity. The merger activity is 
higher within the industries on the low part of the s-curve than those on the high end. 
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Figure 3.4: Percentage of companies on average in an industry across the four Endgame 
stages (Deans, Kroeger and Zeisel, 2003, p. 14). 
Figure 3.5 and 3.6 show average revenue growth and profitability across the Merger Endgame 
stages in an industry. The average revenue growth is fairly stable across all four stages. In the 
Opening Stage revenue growth is 10.6 % in average, falls to 7.6 % in the Scale Stage as 
companies consolidate, and then stabilizes at 8.8 % and 8.1 % in the two final stages.  
 
Figure 3.5: Revenue growth across the Endgame stages (Deans, Kroeger and Zeisel, 2003, p. 17). 
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The average profitability however is not as stable, as figure 3.6 shows. From the Opening 
Stage to the second Scale Stage the average profitability drops from its highest to its lowest 
point on the whole curve. During the two next stages it increases again. 
Figure 3.6: Average profitability across the Endgame stages on the s-curve (Deans, Kroeger and 
Zeisel, 2003, p. 17). 
Deans, Kroeger and Zeisel offer an explanation for the described development in average 
profitability along the curve. The Opening Stage is often dominated by companies in old 
state-run industries that have been recently privatized. Often, these companies use 
monopolistic prices that lead to high profits. In the Scale Stage the industry’s number of firms 
reaches maximum and many firms respond by competing on price, a strategy that drives down 
the industry’s average profitability. In the following two stages most of the competitors are 
eliminated, giving room to increase the prices to healthy profits. However, the threat of 
newcomers is ever present so the average profits never reach as high as in the Opening Stage.  
3.3 Practical implications 
The Merger Endgame framework reveals some practical implications. These are not derived 
through quantitative analyses as with the empirical results but still offer some useful insight 
into the possibilities that the framework offer. 
External growth is an important aspect of the Merger Endgame framework and Deans, 
Kroeger and Zeisel therefore offer a simple tool to evaluate acquisition targets. This tool, 
called the value-building growth matrix, is shown in figure 3.7. 
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Figure 3.7: Matrix to evaluate acquisition targets (Deans, Kroeger and Zeisel, 2003, p. 11). 
The value-building growth matrix is a concept where acquisition targets are categorized as 
Simple growers, Value growers, Underperformers or Profit seekers based on growth in 
revenue and adjusted market cap. Purchasing a company in the underperformers segment 
involves a turnaround as it is performing below industry average in both revenue and value 
growth. Simple growers and Profit seekers are considered more reasonable acquisitions 
targets, as they often involve less of a turnaround. Value growers are performing above 
industry average measured in both revenue and value growth, but tend to be expensive.  
The value-building growth matrix can be used together with the Merger Endgame curve to 
develop M&A strategies. For private equity investors, for example, it might be a good idea to 
buy turnaround targets in the lower part of the s-curve and sell them at the beginning of the 
Focus Stage. If they wait longer increased concentration may make it difficult to stay 
competitive and sell at a favorable price within the industry due to fewer potential buyers. 
3.4 Empirical discussion 
In this section the Merger Endgame research’s empirical foundation and results are discussed. 
Important issues are dataset and parameters, methodology, and theoretical implications. 
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3.4.1 Dataset and parameters 
The empirical foundation of the Merger Endgame is based on a wide scope of firms and 
industries. The first database, A.T. Kearney’s Value-Building Growth database, included 
more than 25,000 global firms and represents 98 % of world market capitalization. The 
dataset from the second database, the Thomson Financial’s SDC Platinum Worldwide M&A, 
covered only one percent of the companies but is significant in terms of value as only 
companies in transactions with a total value of more than 500 million were used. Further, only 
publicly traded companies were used in the research. In general it is unclear how this 
sampling has affected the outcome and if the framework applies for other than publicly listed 
companies. However, the problem is not the size of the dataset but the fact that the time 
period it covers, 1990 – 1999, coincides with the stock market boom. As a consequence the 
results drawn may not reflect normal market and industry conditions. 
In the quantitative analyses two different measures are used to determine the industry 
concentration, where the HHI is considered a reliable parameter (Tirole, 1988). The HHI has a 
90 % correlation with the CR3 making the measure seem reliable.  
3.4.2 Methodology 
In the quantitative analyses the industry segmentation is done in a systematic way and the 
measure of concentration is reliable. However, a period of ten years, split into two five-year 
time frames, may seem short to conclude on the rise and fall of all industries on a global scale. 
Some of the underlying assumptions also seem difficult to grasp. The model assumes a 
constant (de)consolidation speed based on a single measure of the difference in concentration 
between two five-year time frames. This speed may vary and change rapidly. Another 
assumption is that an industry will develop similarly to the next industry’s concentration 
level. This may not be the case as they may evolve differently. 
3.4.3 Results and theoretical implications 
The most obvious critic of the results retrieved by the Merger Endgame research is the fact 
that not all industries evolve accordingly to the s-curve. Several industries such as Oil and 
Tobacco have existed longer than the 20 - 30 years expected by the Merger Endgame (Kalpic, 
2008). Further, several industries have not evolved accordingly to the s-curve where industry 
consolidation is an irreversible process after the first stage (with the exception of the end). 
The oil industry for instance is less concentrated now than for 50 years ago (Kalpic, 2008). 
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Important theoretical implications retrieved from the Merger Endgame research are that all 
industries are global and that economies of scale are the most important driver for growth. 
Both implications are controversial in a scientific context. There are examples of industries 
that are not global. The Fast Moving Consumer Goods retail industry for instance, has major 
differences between local countries and the overall global concentration of the industry 
(Kalpic, 2008). Moreover, not all industries are scale-sensitive and the reasons for industry 
(de)consolidation are not clearly understood in any empirical study up to date.  
The most important theoretical implication is however that all industries, including niche 
markets, consolidate and tend to follow a similar course. This result has different implications 
for CEOs and stockholders as they do not necessarily operate with the same goals or 
incentives. CEOs have incentive to cause their firms to grow due to increased power and the 
fact that compensation is positively correlated to growth in sales (Jensen, 1986). Another 
incentive to grow for a CEO is the reduced risk of losing his job as large firms are less likely 
to become acquisition targets (Hillier, Grinblatt and Titman, 2008). Based on these incentives 
the goal of any CEO is to keep the company running as long as possible as the industry moves 
up the Merger Endgame curve. There is no optimal size: The goal is to grow bigger than the 
competitors and stay ahead while at the same time avoiding getting acquired or go bankrupt.  
This perspective does not necessarily coincide with the stockholders’ for several reasons. 
Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2002) show that large companies tend to become less effective 
and use its internal resources in a suboptimal way, resulting in a relatively reduced market 
value. Penrose (1959) points out that firm size is limited in the long-run by its internal 
management resources as CEOs are not able to run huge companies in an optimal way. 
Moreover, empirical research shows that M&A-transactions often result in value creation for 
the stockholders of the acquisition targets and destroys value for the acquirer’s stockholders 
(McNamara, Haleblian og Dykes, 2008; Langetieg, 1978; Dodd, 1980 and Asquith, 1983). 
Based on these empirical results stockholders will not always benefit from being a part of the 
company as long as possible as the industry moves up the Merger Endgame curve. In some 
cases they should rather cash out and walk away before the company grows too large. 
3.5 Conclusion  
The Merger Endgame research has several weaknesses in its empirical foundation. The major 
weaknesses are the dataset’s short time span of ten years and that it coincides with the stock 
market boom. As a consequence the results drawn may not reflect normal market and industry 
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conditions. However, even with some weaknesses in the empirical foundation, the Merger 
Endgame research brings some interesting insight into the development of industries on a 
global scale. The most important theoretical implications are that all industries, including 
niche markets, consolidate and tend to follow a similar course. The implications effect 
managers and stockholders in different ways. Management has incentive to stay ahead of 
competition by external growth while stockholders in some cases are better off selling the 
company before it grows beyond optimal size. 
4. Analysis of the Aluminum and Paper industries 
In the following sections the Aluminum and Paper industries are presented. Important aspects 
for each industry are product characteristics, product applications, value chain breakdown, 
cost drivers, and supply and demand by nations. Each industry is then analyzed using A.T. 
Kearney’s Merger Endgame and the Hill and Jones’s (2008) framework. The latter integrates 
Porter’s five forces with the PESTEL framework. The purpose of the analysis is to assess the 
industries’ fundamentals, profitability and their future developments. 
Norsk Hydro and Norske Skog are presented after each industry accordingly. Important 
aspects for each company are latest development, recent performance, debt situation, 
operation and assets overview, profitability of operations, operating revenues by region, and 
market position and competitive strategy. Each company is then analyzed in the light of the 
implications from the Merger Endgame framework. The perspective is of the equity holders 
when the companies’ value creation opportunities are identified. However, corresponding 
incentives of the management are also addressed. 
4.1 The Aluminum industry 
The Aluminum industry belongs to the sector Basic Materials. It is a global industry that 
consists of several listed and non-listed companies. The largest aluminum producers are 
multinational with production and distribution facilities around the world.  
4.1.1 Product characteristics 
Aluminum is the third most abundant element on earth and exists in very stable combinations 
with other materials such as silicates and oxides (UC Rusal, A20104). It is the most consumed 
non ferrous metal annually. 
                                                           
4
 A is short for annual report. 
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Aluminum is a versatile metal with a range of properties (UC Rusal, A2010). It is lightweight 
and is about one-third the weight of an equal volume of copper, steel or brass. It is strong in 
the sense that it can withstand heavy loads and pressure, and when alloyed appropriately its 
strength approaches that of steel. It has higher strength-to-weight-ratio than any other metal 
and high value-to-weight. It has corrosion resistance and is flexible to form and shape. It has 
high electrical and thermal conductivity. It is relatively inexpensive and highly recyclable. 
The disadvantages related to aluminum are that it is considered a difficult alloy to weld and 
have toxic effects, such as affecting the central nervous system, in elevated concentrations.  
4.1.2 Applications 
Aluminum is important in virtually all segments of the world economy and serves a wide 
scope of different industries and markets. On a global scale the customer industries can be 
split into transportation, packaging, electrical, engineering, consumer goods, construction, and 
others, as shown in figure 4.1 (Norsk Hydro, A2010).  
Aluminum is used in automobiles, 
airplanes, trucks, railcars, railways and 
marine vessels in the transportation 
segment (Norsk Hydro, A2010). In the 
packaging segment, it is used 
extensively for the protection, storage 
and preparation of food and drinks. 
Cans and foil stock are examples of 
such products. Aluminum is used 
mainly in transmission lines above and 
below ground in the electrical segment, 
while it is used in machinery in the 
engineering industry. Consumer goods involve products such as tools, cooking appliances and 
cooking utensils. Aluminum’s characteristics are well suited for the constructing segment and 
the metal is used in windows, doors, siding, cladding and weatherproofing.  
As some products, especially in the packaging segment, have a short life span, recycling has 
become more important the last 20 years. About 25 percent of new aluminum products are 
made from consumer scrap and more than 75 % of all aluminum produced is still in use 
through continuous aluminum recycling (Norsk Hydro, A2010).  
Figure 4.1: Customer industries in the 
Aluminum industry (Norsk Hydro, A2010) 
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4.1.3 Value chain breakdown 
The Aluminum industry’s value chain can be structured as shown in figure 4.2. 
 
Figure 4.2: The Aluminum industry’s value chain (Norsk Hydro, A2010). 
Upstream includes mining and alumina refining (Norsk Hydro, A2010). In the mining part ore 
bauxite is found and in the following refining part alumina is produced by the Bayer Process. 
This refining process involves washing, grinding, and dissolution in caustic soda, filtration, 
precipitation and separation from water. Between two and three tonnes5 of bauxite are 
required to produce one tonne of alumina depending on the quality. 
Midstream includes smelting. Primary aluminum is produced by the Hall-Heroult process 
which involves dissolving alumina in a chemical bath and passing electric current through it. 
The process is highly energy intensive and requires about 13-16 KWh to produce one kg of 
aluminum. About two tonnes of alumina are required to produce one tonne of primary 
aluminum. Secondary aluminum is produced in special resmelters. Scrap is generated 
throughout the value chain when producing aluminum end-products and is collected in the 
marketplace. The primary and secondary aluminum is in the form of commodities. 
Downstream includes processing within rolling, extrusion or casting. In rolling mills the 
aluminum is rolled into plate, sheet and foil. In extruding plants it is formed into various 
shapes, while in foundries it is cast into various forms. Various metals may be alloyed to 
modify the aluminum’s properties. In the following transformation part the semi-finished 
aluminum products are converted into final products by fabrication processes. Customer 
markets include the industries listed in figure 4.1. 
4.1.4 Cost drivers 
The Aluminum industry is highly capital intensive (UC Rusal, A2010). It matters however 
where on the value chain the company operates. Alumina refining and smelting in the up- and 
midstream are the most capital intensive, while downstream is less capital intensive. 
                                                           
5
 1 tonne = 1 metric ton 
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Figure 4.3 shows the average cost structure in the production of primary aluminum. Key input 
factors needed to produce primary aluminum are energy and alumina from bauxite and caustic 
soda (A.T. Kearney, 2007). Remaining costs are other raw materials, labor and other costs.  
 
Figure 4.3: Average production cost structure (A.T. Kearney analysis, 2007). 
Energy is the largest cost driver in primary aluminum production constituting approximately 
30 % of the total production costs. The second most important cost driver is alumina. As 
alumina is relatively inexpensive to transport, primary aluminum smelters do not need to be 
located close to alumina refineries. Primary plant location decisions are therefore driven by 
access to inexpensive and stable energy sources. For this reason the significant world primary 
aluminum production is found in areas like Russia, Scandinavia and the Middle East.   
Country Reserves % 
Australia 7,860 26.69 
Guinea 5,900 20.03 
Brazil 2,900 9.85 
India 2,650 9.00 
Jamaica 2,000 6.79 
Others 8,140 27.64 
Total 29,450 100.00 
Table 4.1: Reserves of bauxite in million tonnes (Indiainfoline, 22.3.11).   
The most important costs in the production of alumina are energy and bauxite. Bauxite ore 
can be found in tropical regions such as Caribbean, parts of Africa, South America and 
Australia (Indiainfoline, 22.3.11). The largest reserves can be found in Australia, Guinea, 
Brazil, India and Jamaica, as shown in table 4.1. Vietnam, China, Greece, Turkey and the 
Urals in Russia also have some smaller reserves. The tendency in the industry is to construct 
alumina refineries close to the mines as bauxite is expensive to transport.  
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Another, less important cost driver is caustic soda. It is used to make alumina along with 
bauxite and comprises 13 % of the overall cost structure of alumina in average.  
The production of secondary aluminum costs a fraction of primary aluminum as it only 
requires 5 % of the amount of electricity used in primary production (Garen, Jespen and Scott, 
2009). The need for an inexpensive power source is therefore reduced compared to primary 
production. Transportation costs are important so location decisions are driven by sources of 
scrap and location of downstream costumers, who are often the sources of scrap. 
4.1.5 Supply and demand by nations 
In order to understand the fundamentals of the Aluminum industry and the most important 
markets, it is necessary to study the supply of bauxite, alumina and primary aluminum and the 
demand for primary aluminum in different regions. 
SUPPLY OF BAUXITE 
World output of bauxite was 199 million tonnes in 2009 (Mineralsuk, 20.2.11). Australia 
remained the largest producer with a 33 % share of the total. China overtook Brazil’s position 
and become the second largest producer with a 15 % share. China’s production of bauxite has 
increased by 72 % from 2005 to 2009. Other major producers are Indonesia (8 %), Guinea 
(7%) and India (7%). The production of bauxite by nations is shown in figure 4.4. 
 
Figure 4.4: The most significant producers of bauxite in million tonnes from 2005 to 2009 
(Mineralsuk, 20.2.11). All producers are listed in appendix A.2.  
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SUPPLY OF ALUMINA 
World output of alumina was 76.8 million tonnes in 2009 (Mineralsuk, 20.2.11). China 
remained the world’s largest producer with a share of 31 % of the total world production. 
Australia continued as the second largest producer with a share of 26 %. Brazil has increased 
its alumina production by 66 % since 2005 to 2009, and had 11 % of the total share in 2009. 
Other significant producers are the US (4%), India (4%) and Russia (4%). The production of 
alumina by nations is shown in figure 4.5. 
 
Figure 4.5: Producers of alumina in million tonnes from 2005 to 2009 (Mineralsuk, 20.2.11). All 
producers are listed in appendix A.2. 
SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF PRIMARY ALUMINUM 
The demand for primary aluminum has grown rapidly since 1950 (UC Rusal, A2010). The 
production was two million tonnes in 1950, and then grew to 9.5 million in 1970. It reached 
15 million in 1990 and 40.2 million in 2010.  
The production of primary aluminum by nations is shown in figure 4.6. The production has 
been fairly stable the last five years, with the exception of China that has increased its overall 
output of primary aluminum by 80 % between 2006 and 2010 (Mineralsuk, 20.2.11 and UC 
Rusal, press release, Feb. 2011). Russia and Canada are other major producers.  
The primary aluminum consumption by nations is shown in figure 4.7. Especially the BRIC-
countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) have driven the growth in demand over the last 
five years (mcxindia, 15.3.11). Western Europe and North America have shown a steady, 
strong demand but especially North-America experienced a contraction in 2009 and 2010.  
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China is both the largest producer and consumer of primary aluminum with a share above 33 
% of both in 2010. The country has a significant impact on the supply and demand.  
 
Figure 4.6: Production of primary aluminum in million tonnes from 2006 to 2010 (Mineralsuk, 
20.2.11 and UC Rusal, press release, Feb. 2011). All producers are listed in appendix A.2.   
 
Figure 4.7: Consumption of primary aluminum in million tonnes from 2006 to 2010 (mcxindia, 
15.3.11 and UC Rusal, 11.3.11). 
In the period 2007 – 2009 the production of primary aluminum was significant higher than the 
consumption. This led to a price decrease that affected several producers negatively. 
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4.1.6 The outside-in analysis 
The Aluminum industry is highly concentrated.6 The CR3 was 62.1 % in 2010, down from 
72.7 % in 2006. However, by excluding specialized downstream companies the concentration 
has increased from 58.8 % in 2006 to 63.4 % in 2010. 
 
Figure 4.8: The Aluminum industry plotted on the s-curve. 
In late 2006 RUSAL, SUAL and the aluminum assets of Swiss-based Glencore created United 
Company Rusal PLC (UC Rusal). This transaction completed the 15-year process of 
consolidating the Russian Aluminum industry and made UC Rusal the world’s largest 
producer of primary aluminum before Alcoa. Then in 2007 Rio Tinto, one of the world’s 
largest mining companies, acquired Alcan and displaced UC Rusal at the top. These mergers 
have increased the concentration in the industry. At the same time high demand in emerging 
countries like China and India has given companies like Aluminum Corp of China (Chalco), 
Hindalco and several small caps in downstream the opportunity to expand their market shares. 
Government owned smelters in the Middle East, like Dubal and Alba, have also grown in 
market cap in this period. This has driven down the concentration in the industry but not 
enough to stop an increase of 4.6 % in up/midstream between 2006 and 2010.  
In recent years cooperation has become important in up/midstream. Currently half of Norsk 
Hydro’s primary smelters are based on joint ventures (Norsk Hydro, A2010). Another 
                                                           
6
 An overview of analyzed companies and calculations of the s-curve and CAGR growth portfolio 2006 – 2010 
are presented in appendix A.3. 
21 
 
tendency in the industry is that fully integrated companies such as Alcoa and Norsk Hydro are 
diminishing their presence in downstream by sales or spin-offs to increase their focus in the 
up/midstream part of the value chain (Garen, Jespen and Scott, 2009). 
The high concentration level, a positive consolidation direction and increased reliance on 
cooperation indicate that the up- and midstream part of the Aluminum industry is headed 
towards the Balance and Alliance Stage, as shown in figure 4.8. The downstream segment on 
the other hand is deconsolidating and may experience increased competition in the future. 
4.1.6.1 Porter’s five forces and PESTEL 
The purpose of the Porter’s five forces analysis is to measure the rivalry in an industry and 
assess the possibilities of profitability. The forces are rivalry among existing firms, 
determinants of supplier power, threat of substitutes, threat of new entrants and determinants 
of buyer power. Several relevant macroeconomic elements from PESTEL are added to the 
analysis. These factors are political, economic, social, technological and environmental. 
RIVALRY AMONG EXISTING FIRMS 
There are a variety of business models in the Aluminum industry. Fully integrated companies 
like Rio Tinto Alcan, Alcoa and Norsk Hydro cover the complete value chain, from bauxite 
mining, alumina refining, and aluminum smelting into downstream fabrication and customer 
service. Others like UC Rusal, BHP Billiton and Century Aluminum have the same approach 
but are less specialized in the downstream segment. Dubal and Alba are examples that focus 
on smelting as they acquire alumina and sell ingot and other commodity like types of 
aluminum products. While companies like United Anodisers, ESS DEE Aluminum, Alicon 
Castalloy Ltd and Century Extrusions are specialized in the downstream segment. A full 
overview and description of the companies in the industry is presented in appendix A.3. 
The performance of the Aluminum industry from 2006 to 2010 is shown in figure 4.9 and 
4.10. In figure 4.9 the bubbles are adjusted market cap for 2010, while they are revenues in 
figure 4.10. The industry’s compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) for adjusted market cap 
in the period 2006 to 2010 is 10.9 %. The value has grown from 164,878 to 249,737 million. 
The CAGR for revenues is approximately 1.0 %, whereas the value has grown from 148,429 
to 154,622 million.  
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Figure 4.9: Performance in the Aluminum industry from 2006 – 2010. Value growth is CAGR 
of adjusted market cap 2006-2010. Bubble size is adjusted market cap for 2010. 
 
Figure 4.10: Performance in the Aluminum industry from 2006 – 2010. Value growth is CAGR 
of adjusted market cap 2006-2010. Bubble size is revenue for 2010. 
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The fully vertically integrated companies dominate the industry in size. Rio Tinto Alcan, 
Hindalco and UC Rusal have outperformed the industry’s average measured in both revenues 
and adjusted market cap growth from 2006 to 2010. Among the remaining fully integrated 
companies Chalco is a simple grower, while Alcoa and Norsk Hydro are underperformers. 
The greatest value growers are specialized companies from India, China and the Middle East.  
The revenue growth in the Focus Stage according to the Merger Endgame research spans 
from 0 % to 30 % with an average of 8.8 %. The span in the Aluminum industry from 2006 to 
2010 is – 19 % to 70 %, with an average close to 1 %. The average operating income margin7 
is higher than expected both in 2006 and 2010. In the Focus Stage the operating margin spans 
from 3 % to 15 % according to the Merger Endgame research, whereas the average operating 
margin spans from 7 % to 12 %. In 2006 the range was – 1.9 % to 45 % for the Aluminum 
industry, with an average of 23 %. In 2010 it was 2.8 % to 34 %, with an average of 27.2 %.  
The highest average operating income margins are found in up/midstream. The companies 
specialized in downstream made an average operating income margin of 23.6 % in 2006 and 
8.4 % in 2010. The remaining companies that are not operating only in downstream made an 
average operating margin of 35.8 % in 2006 and 11.9 % in 2010.  
 
Figure 4.11: Overview of important factors in the value chain of aluminum production. 
In the upstream segment considerable machinery and equipment are involved, so mining 
activity and alumina refineries require substantial investment (Garen, Jespen and Scott, 2009). 
Bauxite is chemically and physically heterogeneous, and so the refineries are often specific to 
the site of the mine and are dedicated to that mine. Bauxite mines and alumina refineries, once 
constructed, also are largely irreversible, making the costs of the initial investment sunk.  
                                                           
7
 Operating income margins refers to EBIT/Revenues. As this size does not take into account the financial costs 
the high average operating margins found in the Aluminum industry may reflect that the industry is capital 
intensive with high start-up costs. 
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Primary aluminum smelting requires a large investment in plant and equipment (Garen, 
Jespen and Scott, 2009). The smelters have a running time up to 40 years but often require 
technological upgrades. The production is continuous, which makes it critical to have a 
reliable source of alumina and electricity. Cut in power supply may lead to severe destructions 
and the smelters are costly to start up. Access to inexpensive power supply and shore 
proximity are dominant factors in locating primary aluminum smelters as alumina is a 
commodity-like product with relatively high value-to-weight that makes it cheap to transport. 
There are significant economies of scale in modern aluminum smelters. Minimum efficient 
scale for a modern smelter is 300,000 tonnes per year. Primary aluminum is a commodity 
quoted on several exchanges, namely the London Metal Exchange (LME), the Tokyo 
Commodity Exchange (TOCOM), the Shanghai Futures Exchange (SHFE) and the New York 
Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX). These exchanges are highly transparent and provide 
direction of the world’s aluminum prices. As a consequence independent downstream 
companies can make arm’s length transactions with primary aluminum producers. 
The reduced possibility for product differentiation and ways to pass (increased) costs on 
through to the customer in the up- and midstream part of the value chain, means that the focus 
is mainly on process improvement that can increase the profitability of operations rather than 
differentiation (Grimsrud and Kvinge, 2006). Incumbents have historically been eager to 
backward integrate, upgrade current processing technology and increase the use of secondary 
aluminum in order to become cost efficient and secure high operating income margins. The 
primary smelting is fairly technology intensive and primary aluminum production has made 
significant progress in energy efficiency. Modern production technology uses approximately 
25 percent less energy than the average in 1990 (Qatalum, 24.3.11). 
In downstream value-adding to the primary aluminum creates possibilities for product 
differentiation (Grimsrud and Kvinge, 2006). As mentioned this stream can be broken into 
rolling, extruding and casting. The production of rolling products requires a relatively large 
investment, offers little degree of product differentiation and is driven by economies of scale. 
As a consequence there exist a limited number of rolling mills worldwide and these operate 
with a large capacity. Extruders and casters on the other hand are not driven by economies of 
scale and offer some degree of product differentiation. There are therefore several small 
extruders and casters in the world that serve local customers. Most of the extruded and casted 
products are commodity-like but some are special, high-tech products used in industries such 
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as aerospace and engineering. The specialized products are often technology intensive and 
developed in close relation with the end-customer. 
The important drivers of profitability for each stream in the Aluminum industry can be broken 
down as seen in figure 4.11. The demand for primary aluminum is in direct positive 
correlation with world GDP growth (A.T. Kearney, 2009). This correlation is shown in figure 
4.12 for the period 1980 to 2006. A high world GDP growth means high demand for end-
products in construction, packaging and other costumer industries. This will increase the 
demand for primary aluminum, putting upwards pressure on the commodity’s price listed at 
exchanges such as the LME. Next, the prices of bauxite and alumina are affected as the prices 
of these resources tend to follow primary aluminum’s over time (Norsk Hydro, A2010). 
 
Figure 4.12: Global demand for primary aluminum is in direct positive correlation 
with world GDP growth (A.T. Kearney, 2009). 
Environmental regulations affect the industry. Countries that are part of the Kyoto Protocol 
are obliged to decrease their pollution emissions. In this way the Aluminum industry in the 
European region is affected. The EU Emissions Trading Directive established an internal 
emission trading system in CO2 emission allowances for the period 2005 – 2012 (Norsk 
Hydro, A2010). In April 2009, the EU formally approved its “20-20-20” climate change 
package. The goal is to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 20 %, improve the energy efficiency 
by 20 % and increase the energy share of renewable energy by 20 %, all within 2020. In order 
to fulfill these goals there is today a levy on CO2 that have increased the price on electricity in 
the European region. As aluminium is a globally traded commodity the European-based 
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companies are not able to pass the levy, nearly 1/3 of the electricity price8, through to the 
customer. The Norwegian Aluminum industry is affected through the EØS. Countries like the 
US, Australia, Japan, China and Qatar among others are not part of the Kyoto Protocol. 
The rivalry is intense in the up/midstream part of the Aluminum industry. In order to stay 
competitive companies strive to reduce operation costs as there is no product differentiation.  
This has driven up the concentration in up/midstream as incumbents seek economies of scale 
and resource control in order to minimize costs. At the same time the incumbents are getting 
their positions threatened by a rapidly smelting capacity expansion in the Middle-East, China 
and India. However, the operating margins are higher than expected by the Merger Endgame 
mainly due to a strong demand for primary aluminum in 2006 and 2010 that offset the rivalry. 
The companies specialized in downstream offer smaller operating margins than those in up- 
and midstream due to lower concentration. The reason is that it is easier for newcomers to 
access the market as the required start-up capital is lower. As a result the segment has many 
small companies that are relatively equal in size. The rivalry is to some extent offset by the 
possibility for product differentiation and greater diversity in manufacturing and processing. 
DETERMINANTS OF SUPPLIER POWER 
The main reason for the consolidation seems, in line with the Merger Endgame’s logic, to be 
driven by economies of scale. Another reason is the need to control and secure resources.  
 
Figure 4.13: Top ten producers of primary aluminum in 2007 (A.T. Kearney, 2009). 
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 Interviews Norsk Hydro, 31.3.11 
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In 2007 ten companies produced 54 % of the world’s primary aluminum, as shown in figure 
4.13 (A.T. Kearney, 2009). The top three, Rio Tinto Alcan, Chalco and UC Rusal, accounted 
for 32 %. The same year 72 % of bauxite was directly processed by integrated aluminum 
manufactures, while only 28 % was traded freely. The fully integrated companies Rio Tinto 
Alcan, BHP Billiton, UC Rusal, Alcoa Inc, BHP Billiton, Chalco and Norsk Hydro accounted 
for nearly 60 % of the world’s output of bauxite in 2007 (Garen, Jespen and Scott, 2009). The 
top two, Rio Tinto Alcan and Alcoa, by themselves accounted for more than 30 %.  
The three largest producers of primary aluminum, Rio Tinto Alcan, Alcoa and UC Rusal, 
accounted for around 46 % of world output of alumina in 2007 (Garen, Jespen and Scott, 
2009). The top six, which also includes BHP Billiton, Chalco and Norsk Hydro, accounted for 
almost 64 % of the world’s total. 
It has not been much change between the producers of primary aluminum since 2007. In 2009 
the nine companies produced 53 % of the world’s primary aluminum, as shown in figure 4.14 
(Norsk Hydro, 2010). The top three, Rio Tinto Alcan, Chalco and UC Rusal, accounted for 31 
% of the total, one percent less than in 2007. 
 
Figure 4.14: Top nine producers of primary aluminum in 2009 (Norsk Hydro, 2011). 
The large, fully integrated companies have invested heavily in up- and downstream and 
manage every aspect of the value chain. As a consequence the largest producers of bauxite 
and alumina are also the largest producers of primary aluminum. This major backward 
integration has reduced the supplier power in the industry for the incumbents. 
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The primary aluminum smelters rely on a stable supply of energy. About 30 % of the required 
energy is on average generated in own power plants (A.T. Kearney, 2007). The remaining 
energy is normally traded on medium to long term contracts in the marketplace. The Nordic 
countries have had a common Nordic electricity market since the late 1990’s (Norsk Hydro, 
A2010). In countries like China and India the energy sector is highly regulated and the 
government is the only supplier in the market. Since energy stands for a significant part of the 
cost structure, price changes can have a drastic effect on the profitability of operations.  
In general the supplier power is moderate in up/midstream but severe for specialized smelters 
that are not backward integrated. It is more modest in downstream as companies can make 
arm’s length transactions with primary aluminum producers through commodity exchanges. 
THREAT OF SUBSTITUTES 
Aluminum faces the threat of several substitutes. Steel is a substitute in the automobile and 
construction sector (US Geo Surevy, 2000). Copper is a substitute within the power sector and 
in electrical applications due to higher conductivity. Composites, wood and steel are 
substitutes in construction, while glass, plastics, paper and steel are substitutes in packaging.  
 
Figure 4.15: The relative price of aluminum (A.T. Kearney, 2009). 
Social and environmental factors have played an important role for the increase of aluminum 
demand. Aluminum is highly recyclable and therefore considered environmental friendly. 
However, it also offers other characteristics. In the automotive industry for instance, cars can 
become more fuel efficient because aluminum is
percent reduction of car weight corresponds to a nine percent increase of fuel consumption 
efficiency
A
recyclable,
(A.T. Kearney, 2009)
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favors, such as subsidies and favorable tariff agreements (Garen, Jespen and Scott, 2009). The 
goal is to create national champions. 
In China the costs of building new smelting capacity are low by world standards due to cheap 
labor and bauxite reserves (Garen, Jespen and Scott, 2009). However, the growth in economic 
activity and the Chinese households’ real income are straining the nation’s capacity to satisfy 
all the competing demands for electricity. The power is therefore not cheap by world 
standards and the electricity costs in primary smelting are 45 % compared to the world’s 
average of 31 % (steelguru, 16.3.11). Figure 4.18 shows the country’s high average power 
costs. Tightening in power supply by the government will most likely make China a net 
importer the following years if several smelters are not upgraded (UC Rusal, 1.4.11).   
India is self-sufficient with raw material and has one of the largest reserves of bauxite in the 
world, as shown in table 4.1. Raw material account for 35 % of the cost structure of primary 
aluminum production compared to the global average of 45 % (Garen, Jespen and Scott, 
2009). In general the energy costs are high compared to other producers. Nonetheless, 
National Aluminum Company (Nalco) and Hindalco operate their own power plants and have 
one of the lowest production costs in the world, making them highly globally competitive. 
 
Figure 4.18: Average power prices for the Aluminum industry (Norsk Hydro, 1.4.11). 
In the period 2006 – 2010 small caps that are specialized in downstream from emerging 
markets have gained market shares. India is a good example with companies like United 
Anodisers NV, Sudal Industries Ltd, Sacheta Metals Ltd, Nirav Commercials Ltd, Manaksia 
Ltd, Maan Aluminum Ltd, Gujarat Foils Ltd and Enkei Castalloy Ltd. Gujarat Foils Ltd is the 
biggest grower with an almost 99 % CAGR of adjusted market cap between 2006 and 2010. 
The high growth can be explained by relatively low barriers of entry in the sense of moderate 
capital requirements, a high underlying demand, superior understanding of local culture and 
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ways of doing business, along with political initiative in the form of for example high duty on 
imported downstream products from China (Garen, Jespen and Scott, 2009). 
The specialized Middle-East based smelters like Dubal and Alba have access to cheap energy 
sources but rely on import of labor and raw material (Garen, Jespen and Scott, 2009). The 
Middle East’s power price advantage is shown in figure 4.18. 
The threat of newcomers seems immense in up/midstream. As the technology applied in 
alumina refining and smelting is well known and fairly standard it will always be the risk of 
overcapacity driven by low cost producers. Several smelters in high cost countries may 
become unprofitable due to oversupply if the demand growth cannot keep up. However, this 
threat is somewhat offset by the fact that the largest primary aluminum producers control 
most of the bauxite/alumina resources. As a consequence many of the specialized smelters 
will rely on the major companies in the industry in order to further expand their capacity. The 
threat of newcomers is also immense in downstream due to relatively low barriers of entry.  
DETERMINANTS OF BUYER POWER 
The CR3 estimates show that up/midstream is highly concentrated but the ability to control the 
supply side of primary aluminum still seems limited due to new entrants. The concentration 
level is lower in downstream and this part of the value chain is expected to continue to 
deconsolidate. The general implication of this is that the ability to control the demand side for 
companies in downstream will become reduced in the future. As a result the buyer power for 
the companies involved in up/midstream may become weaker over time.   
An indirect part of buyer power is speculation. The price of primary aluminum is highly 
volatile, as shown in figure 4.19 (A.T. Kearney, 2009). It is mainly driven by fundamentals 
but trading by financial investors in the derivative markets can have a significant influence on 
price developments in the short and medium term, occasionally in contradiction with 
developments in the physical market (Norsk Hydro, 2010). According to Norsk Hydro’s 
annual report for 2010 this may have been the case in 2009 and 2010.  
Another indirect part of buyer power is hedging. The high price volatility implies that 
companies in up/midstream must be prepared for periods with low revenues. In the Aluminum 
industry several tactics are used in order to secure a predictable revenue stream. BHP Billiton 
and Rio Tinto Alcan apply diversity in operations and mine a variety of different metals and 
ores around the world (Garen, Jespen and Scott, 2009). This reduces the financial risk but also 
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enables the companies to take advantage of economies of scope and create synergies. Others, 
like Norsk Hydro and Hindalco, stabilize their cash flow by operating both in up/midstream 
and downstream. Norsk Hydro also applies one year forward contracts on primary aluminum 
(Norsk Hydro, A2010). Another risk is currency movements. Aluminum is normally priced in 
U.S. dollars so currency movements can have a significant impact on short-term profitability. 
 
Figure 4.19: LME 3-months aluminum price in USD/tonne from 1968 to 2008 (A.T. Kearney, 2009). 
The relative concentration between companies in downstream and their customers is less 
important because downstream companies have the possibility to create customer lock-ins by 
product differentiation. By doing so it becomes possible to pass increased costs through to the 
customers. Nonetheless, backward integration is common in this part of the value chain. 
Toyota for instance, is resmelting and casting in-house (Garen, Jespen and Scott, 2009). 
Companies in downstream are in general less profitable than those in up/midstream but tend 
to have less fluctuation in prices (Kumar, 2009). The financial risk is still present however. 
Novelis, one of USA’s largest downstream companies, had entered into fixed-price long-term 
contracts with four major companies in the beginning of 2005. During the year the raw 
materials prices rose sharply and Novelis started losing money on those deals. 
In general the buyer power is moderate for up/midstream. It can potentially become weaker 
for companies in downstream as customer lock-ins is possible by product differentiation. 
However, backward-integration is a severe threat in this part of the value chain. 
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4.1.6.2 Summary and overview of industry trends 
The Porter’s five forces analysis shows that the Aluminum industry is an attractive industry. 
The value created is mainly shared among the rivals and little is leaked to the other forces. In 
up/midstream the rivalry is intense due to little product differentiation but is considerably 
offset by the growing demand for primary aluminum. In downstream the rivalry is to some 
degree offset by the possibility for product differentiation. As a consequence the operating 
margins in the Aluminum industry are higher than anticipated by the Merger Endgame.  
Nonetheless, there are severe threats for the industry’s future profitability. The largest threat is 
that the growing demand for primary aluminum and high operating margins will motivate 
newcomers to continue to rapidly expanding their capacity and finally trigger worldwide 
oversupply. The Porter’s five forces analysis is summarized in figure 4.20. 
 
Figure 4.20: Porter’s five forces in the Aluminum industry. 
The Aluminum industry has now passed the Focus Stage where the focus has been less on 
scale and more on internal finesse. Several fully integrated companies have diminished their 
presence downstream during this stage. The main reason is that the production of primary 
aluminum and product development in downstream require different skills, making it difficult 
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to compete in both business areas at the same time. The advantages of a full integration are 
also minimal because primary aluminum is a commodity traded worldwide. 
The Merger Endgame reveals that up/midstream is entering the Balance and Alliance Stage 
where cooperation and joint ventures will be increasingly important. This tendency is already 
reflected in Norsk Hydro’s operations where currently six of twelve primary smelters are 
based on joint ventures. The Merger Endgame reveals that downstream is showing a negative 
consolidation direction. The reasons are newcomers, spin-offs from incumbents and a limited 
degree of scale-sensitivity within most of the downstream segments. It is expected that the 
continuing deconsolidation in this part of the value chain will increase the rivalry over time. 
Company (Nation) Cost of production (USD/tonne) 
Kaiser (US) 1,315 
Hydro (Norway) 1,305 
VAW (Germany) 1,298 
Alcoa (US) 1,251 
Pechinery (France) 1,200 
Comalco (Australia) 1,200 
Reynolds (US) 1,188 
Alumax (US) 1,176 
Alcan (Canada) 1,113 
Hindalco (India) 1,060 
Alusaf (S.Africa) 1,026 
Nalco (India) 900 
World Average 1,249 
Table 4.2: Comparable cost of aluminum production in 2006 (India Infoline, 22.3.11). 
A trend in the industry is the shift away from high cost countries in continental Europe and 
the US to the Middle-East, India, Iceland and some parts of Africa, Asia and South America 
(Norsk Hydro, A2010). Table 4.2 shows comparable cost of primary aluminum production in 
2006 for some major companies in the industry. Producers from USA, Norway and Germany 
are among the most expensive, measured in USD/tonnes, while India and South Africa are 
represented with the lowest costs (India Infoline, 22.3.11). In December 2009 the European 
Aluminum Association stated that approximately 66 % of the aluminum producers in Europe 
will be shut down due to the constant increasing electricity prices (Euopean Aluminum 
Association, 24.3.11). This equals a primary aluminum capacity of two million tonnes. 
The outlooks for primary aluminum are positive. The market anticipates a price increase as 
27-months futures for primary aluminum are traded 150 USD/tonne above the current spot 
price at 2,600 (LME, 24.3.11). The futures price for primary aluminum is shown in figure 
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4.21. Norsk Hydro expects the demand for primary aluminum to grow nearly 7 % outside 
China to 24.3 tonnes and around 10 % in China to 16.8 million in 2011 (Norsk Hydro, Press 
release Feb 2011). The company believes the market will be in a manageable surplus globally.  
 
In a longer perspective it is forecasted that the primary aluminum demand will increase nearly 
76 % to 70 million tonnes from 2010 to 2020 (Norsk Hydro, Press release Feb 2011). 
Moreover, the demand for secondary aluminum is anticipated to continue to grow due to 
environmental, operational and social factors (A.T. Kearney, 2009). Figure 4.22 shows the 
production of primary and secondary aluminum the last 50 years. 
Brazil, Russia, India and China have contributed over a third of world GDP growth the past 
ten years (Goldman Sachs, 2010). Estimates show that the BRIC-countries will continue to 
grow and contribute with approximately 45 % of world GDP the next decade. China’s share is 
30 %, while the remaining countries have approximately 5 % each. The growth will mainly be 
driven by a rapidly emerging middle class that is increasing its consumption. 
4.1.7 Presentation of Norsk Hydro 
In this section Norsk Hydro is first presented and then assessed in the light of the outside-in 
analysis and the Merger Endgame framework. 
PRESENTATION 
Norsk Hydro is listed on Oslo Stock Exchange under the ticker NHY (Norsk Hydro, A2010). 
It was founded in 1905 and is headquartered in Oslo, Norway. It employs 23,000 people and 
operates in more than 40 countries on all continents. Svein Richard Brandtzæg has been the 
Figure 4.21: Future on primary aluminum 
measured in USD/tonne (LME, 24.3.11). 
Figure 4.22: Consumption of recycled and primary 
aluminum (Aluminum Association of India, 24.3.11). 
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CEO since 2009. As of April 4 2011 the Norwegian government’s Ministry of Trade has a 46 
% ownership interest.  
In the end of 2010 the company had total assets worth 16.15 billion financed with 65 % 
equity. At 28.4.11 the company has a trailing price-to-book ratio (P/B) of 1.67.  
LATEST DEVELOPMENT 
Norsk Hydro has restructured its operations during the last ten years. The agricultural division 
was in 2004 demerged into the independent company Yara International, listed on the Oslo 
Stock Exchange. In 2007 the oil and gas division was merged with Statoil. From being a 
diversified company with stakes in oil and gas, fish, agriculture and magnesium, Norsk 
Hydro’s current focus is limited to the aluminum value chain and energy. 
In recent years Norsk Hydro has shut down parts of its primary aluminum smelting capacity 
in Europe. Between 2004 and 2005 the energy price rose 16 % in the EU and 6.7 % in 
Norway (Grimsrud and Kvinge, 2006). The average price for the Aluminum industry in 2005 
was 0.107 USD/kWh in EU and 0.0287 in Norway. As Norsk Hydro did not manage to renew 
its long-term energy contracts it was in 2006 forced to shut down two smelters in Germany, 
Stade and Hamburger Aluminium Werk (Norsk Hydro, 29.3.11).  
Stricter government emission policies launched in 2000 led to the closing of production lines 
using Søderberg technology in 2003. This affected the plants at Høyanger, Årdal and Sunndal. 
Only Sunndal got the production lines replaced with the improved prebaked technology in 
2004. The Søderberg line at Karmøy was upgraded and did meet the government’s emission 
requirements but was later shut down in 2009 due to high costs. 
Norsk Hydro has reduced its exposure in downstream. Late in 2009 the Automotive division 
at Raufoss was given away to the German company Benteler with a loss of 44.55 million 
(Norsk Hydro, 29.3.11). In 2012 the extrusion plant at Karmøy will be phased out, while 
operations at the extrusion plants at Magnor and Raufoss are strengthened. 
Norsk Hydro’s reduction in downstream has been met with heavy investments in 
up/midstream abroad. In 2010 Norsk Hydro launched Qatalum in Qatar, one of the largest and 
most cost-efficient aluminum plants in the world, with a capacity of 585,000 tonnes of 
primary aluminum in the first phase (Norsk Hydro, 29.3.11). The infrastructure has been 
designed to allow for an expansion up to 1.2 million. The plant is a joint venture with Qatar 
Petroleum that ensures a stable supply of electricity with a dedicated gas power plant with an 
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installed capacity of 1,350 MW. Qatalum will mainly serve Asia and the US but can 
potentially also serve Europe (Interview Norsk Hydro, 31.2.11). 
In February 2011 Norsk Hydro acquired Vale SA’s aluminum operations in Brazil for 4.9 
billion. The deal involved control of Paragominas, the world’s third largest bauxite mine. It 
has currently a capacity of 7.5 million tonnes bauxite but the goal is to produce 10 million 
during 2011. The deal also involved a 91% ownership in the world's largest alumina refinery, 
Alunorte, along with 51% of the Albra’s aluminum plant and 81% of the CAP alumina 
refinery project. The Alunorte refinery has a capacity of 6.3 million tonnes alumina. The CAP 
project has currently a capacity of 1.9 million tonnes alumina but can be expanded to 7.4 
million. Albra has a capacity of 560,000 tonnes primary aluminum. Norsk Hydro intends to 
sell the bauxite/alumina not used in its own primary aluminum production to the market place 
(Interview Norsk Hydro, 31.2.11). 
The last ten years of restructuring and strong operational focus in order to stay competitive is 
in line with what is expected in the Merger Endgame’s Focus Stage.  
RECENT PERFORMANCE 
Norsk Hydro’s recent performance is shown in figure 4.23 (Netfonds, 9.4.11). The company 
has experienced declining revenues from 2006 to 2009. Turmoil in the world economy led to 
a weak demand for primary aluminum that affected Norsk Hydro’s profitability negatively.  
 
Figure 4.23: Market performance 17.9.97 – 9.4.11 in NOK (Netfonds, 9.4.11).  
As stated earlier Norsk Hydro has underperformed in the period 2006 to 2010 compared to the 
industry overall. The average operating income margin for companies not specialized in 
downstream was 35.8 % in 2006 and 11.9 % in 2010. Norsk Hydro’s corresponding operating 
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margins were 29.5 % and 4.3 %. The net income margins in the same period were 9.7 % and 
2.8 %. Norsk Hydro’s revenues, EBIT and earnings are shown in figure 4.24. 
 
Figure 4.24: Performance 2006 – 2010 in billions (Norsk Hydro, A2010). 
DEBT SITUATION 
Norsk Hydro current credit ratings are BBB by S&P and Baa2 by Moody’s with positive 
outlooks. These evaluations imply that the bonds issued are investment grade. 
At the end of 2010 Norsk Hydro had interest-bearing non-current liabilities of 2.97 billion 
(15,706 million NOK) and interest-bearing current liabilities of 3.0 billion (15,836 million 
NOK). It also had 2.07 billion (10,929 million NOK) in cash and cash equivalents. This gives 
a net interest-bearing debt of 3.9 billion (20,613 NOK). The book value of equity excluded 
minority interest in the end of 2010 was 10.63 billion (56,221 million NOK). This gives a 
gearing of 36.7 %. Norsk Hydro’s long term goal is to keep the gearing below 40 %. The 
acquisition of Vale in 2011 was done by equity and will reduce the gearing. As of December 
2010 Norsk Hydro has no outstanding bonds. 
OPERATIONS AND ASSETS 
 In 2010 68 % of the capital employed was 
related to primary aluminum, 15 % in rolled 
products, 11 % in extruded products and 6 % 
in energy (Norsk Hydro, A2010). The capital 
employed is shown in figure 4.25.  
Primary aluminum: Norsk Hydro produced 
primary aluminum at 11 wholly or partly Figure 4.25: Capital employed (Norsk Hydro, 
A2010). 
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owned primary aluminum plants in 2010. These include the Norwegian plant in Sunndal, 
which is the largest and most modern primary smelter in Europe, and the new 50 percent 
owned Qatalum. Norsk Hydro’s primary smelters are shown in table 4.3. 
In 2010 Norsk Hydro covered approximately 50 % of the energy consumption of the wholly 
owned Norwegian smelters by their own hydropower production. The remainder was mainly 
covered by external supply contracts with Statkraft that expire in 2020. Norsk Hydro also has 
a power contract with the Swedish company Vattenfall for the supply of close to 18 TWh over 
an eight-year period starting in 2013. This will cover 85 % of Søral’s power need until the end 
of 2020. Energy for the remaining smelters is covered with medium- to long-term contracts 
with the exception of the German smelter Neuss, which is covered in the short-term market. 
Plant Country Capacity (000’ tonnes) Ownership (%)  Power contract expires 
Karmøy Norway 120 100  2020 
Årdal Norway 190 100  2020 
Sunndal Norway 390 100  2020 
Høyanger Norway 60 100  2020 
Søral Norway 90 49.9  2012 
Slovalco Slovakia 165 55.3  2013 
Neuss Germany 235 100  Short-term 
Kurri Kurri Australia 180 100  2017 
Tomago Australia 65 12.4  - 
Qatalum Qatar 500* 50  Self-sufficient 
Alouette Canada 115 20  - 
Albras Brazil 460 51  Self-sufficient 
Total (weighted)  1,827   
*500 in 2011 and then 585 from 2012. Potentially 1.2 million. 
Table 4.3: Hydro’s primary aluminum smelters (Norsk Hydro, A2010). 
Metal market: Norsk Hydro has stand alone resmelters in Luxembourg, the UK, Germany, 
Spain, France, Taiwan and two in the US, along with casthouses integrated in their primary 
metal plants. It has return agreements for scrap from customers and other third-parties. The 
secondary aluminum is sold to external producers or shipped to own downstream production.  
Rolled products: Norsk Hydro produces rolled products at five rolling mills located in Europe 
and one in Malaysia. In 2010 more than half of the European production was produced in the 
Grevenbroich mill, which is the largest and one of the most modern and efficient rolling 
operations in the world. More than half of the metal processed was sourced internally. The 
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full overview of Norsk Hydro’s rolling mills is shown in table 4.4. Several sales offices 
support this function in Europe, Brazil, the US, Malaysia and Singapore. 
Plant Country Capacity (000’ tonnes) Ownership (%)  
Grevenbroich Germany 650 50  
Hamburg Germany 180 100  
Slim Italy 95 100  
Karmøy Norway 95 100  
Holmestrand Norway 83 100  
AISB Malaysia 30 81  
Total (weighted)  802  
        Table 4.4: Hydro’s rolling mills (Norsk Hydro, A2010). 
Extruded products: The producers of extruded products are organized into three geographical 
business sectors: Extrusion Eurasia, Extrusion North America and Extrusion South America. 
Extrusion Eurasia operates 19 extrusion plants in 11 countries in Europe and eight sites 
dedicated to fabrication activities. As of the end of 2010, this sector employs around 3,300. 
Extrusion North America operates eight plants in North America and employs around 1,325. 
Extrusion South America is the third-largest extruder in South America with plants in 
Argentina and Brazil. The sector employs 400.  
Norsk Hydro operates within Precision Tubing in extruded products and is a global provider 
of heat transfer applications with eight manufacturing facilities located in Belgium, Brazil, 
China, Denmark, Germany, Mexico, the UK and the US. Extruded products also include 
Building System under the brands Technal, Wicona and Domal/Alumafel. As of the end of 
2010, this sector employs 2,850 in 140 locations in Europe, three in Asia and two in the 
Americas, including sales, distribution and service. 
Energy: Norsk Hydro operates 17 hydroelectric power plants in Norway, with a total installed 
capacity of 1,762 MW. They are located in three main areas, Telemark, Sogn and Røldal-
Suldal, and managed from Rjukan in Telemark. The capacity is planned to be expanded by 54 
MW within year 2015. In addition to sourcing power to cover approximately 50 % of the 
yearly demand of the Norwegian aluminum operations, Norsk Hydro sells energy to former 
petrochemicals industry and about one TWh of electricity to local communities. The company 
also has minority shares in two solar energy companies, NorSun and Ascent Sun. 
Norsk Hydro’s value chain is loosely connected with internal transactions of resources. The 
price of primary aluminum at the LME for instance, is used as a reference point between 
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midstream and downstream transactions to secure internal competition and profitability. It 
seems natural that bauxite and alumina are integrated the same way after the acquisition of 
Vale’s assets. However, the prices of bauxite and alumina are not listed on any commodity 
exchange like the LME and the prices are therefore not worldwide transparent.  
PROFITABILITY OF OPERATIONS 
Revenues and operating income margins by operations are shown in figure 4.26 and 4.27. 
 
Figure 4.26: Revenues in billion USD by operations (Norsk Hydro, A2006-2010). 
 
Figure 4.27: Operating income margins in percent by operations (Norsk Hydro, A2006-2010). 
The primary aluminum segment offers high but volatile operating income margins, while 
downstream offers lower but less volatile margins. Presence in both up/midstream and 
downstream stabilizes the cash flow. Energy shows strong margins and can be used to hedge 
against periods with low primary aluminum prices (and high energy prices in Norway). 
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OPERATING REVENUES BY REGION 
Norsk Hydro’s major customer base is found 
in Europe. This region made up 72 % of the 
operating revenues in 2010, as shown in 
figure 4.28. Asia represented 14 %, USA 9 %, 
South America 3 %, and Australia and New 
Zealand 2 %. 
 
Figure 4.28: Hydro’s operating revenues FY2010                                                                                  
by region (Norsk Hydro, A2010). 
MARKET POSITION AND COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 
In 2010 Norsk Hydro was the fifth largest producer of primary aluminum in the world. The 
company invests heavy in R&D with the goal of increasing its operating margins and is 
currently a leader in the utilization of electrolysis technology in primary aluminum smelters 
(Interviews Norsk Hydro, 31.3.11). 
 
Figure 4.29: Reduced energy consumption in kwh/Kg aluminum (Norsk Hydro, A2009). 
The average energy consumption in the wholly owned primary smelters has been reduced 
from nearly 14.9 kwh/Kg in 1998 to 13.7 in 2009 due to the installment of the prebake 
technology (Norsk Hydro, A2009). Qatalum operates close to 13.2 kwh/Kg, while the goal is 
12.9 with the next generation technology, HAL4e. The development is shown in figure 4.29.  
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Norsk Hydro’s primary smelters are today close to the industry’s average cost level or slightly 
above this level (Interviews Norsk Hydro, 31.3.11).9 A low primary aluminum price forced 
Norsk Hydro to reduce its production at several primary smelters during 2009. This was the 
case for Sunndal and Søral in Norway, Slovalco in Slovakia and Neuss in Germany. Neuss 
reduced its production with 78 %, from 235,000 to 50,000 tonnes. The total reduction in 2009 
amounted to 248,000 tonnes and the capacity was kept idle for all these smelters during 2010, 
with the exception of Slovalco that was re-opened.  
Qatalum in Qatar plays an important role in Norsk Hydro’s primary smelter portfolio and has 
secured the company an important foothold in the Asian market. This primary smelter along 
with two more in Australia are already supplying the Chinese market and gaining market 
shares (Interviews Norsk Hydro, 31.3.11). Qatalum can compete with the Chinese primary 
smelters and secure a sustainable operating income margin. 
Norsk Hydro is one of the leaders in resmelting (Norsk Hydro, A2010). Normally half of the 
company’s total sales of metal each year come from secondary aluminum. It relies on long 
term agreements with its customer and other third-parties to secure a steady supply of input.  
Market sector  Shipment Key characteristic Important customers 
Lithography 19 % Leading supplier globally Kodak, FujiFilm and AGFA 
Packaging and Building 43 % Strong position within high value-
added foil and the liquid packaging 
market. 
TetraPark, Ball, Rexam and 
Crown (Packaging)  
Heat-Exchanger, 
Automotive  and 
General Engineering 
38 % Largest supplier within Heat-
Exchanger and second largest supplier 
within Automotive in Europe. 
Beht, Denso and Modine (Heat 
Exchanger). BMW and 
Daimler (Automotive) 
Table 4.5: Norsk Hydro rolled products data (Norsk Hydro, A2010). 
Norsk Hydro is the largest producer of rolled products in Europe with a market share of 19 %. 
Approximately 75 % of the revenues come from this region. It serves a broad specter of 
market sectors: Lithography, Packaging and Building, Automotive, Heat Exchanger and 
General Engineering. Norsk Hydro competes on cost effectiveness provided by economies of 
scale and strives for product differentiation through high value added products. It holds 
leading global positions within products such as aseptic foil, heat exchanger and sheet for 
printing plates. The latter market is characterized by high customer quality requirements. Key 
points regarding rolled products are shown in table 4.5. 
                                                           
9
 Norsk Hydro does not share exact numbers regarding their primary smelters’ competiveness. 
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Norsk Hydro is a global supplier within extruded products and serves mainly Europe and 
North-America. It also has an extruder in South-America that is the third-largest in the region. 
Norsk Hydro operating in the following sectors: Building and Construction, Transportation 
and Consumer Goods and Other. As the business segment offers no economies of scale Norsk 
Hydro’s extruder facilities are small in size and located near the customer. Norsk Hydro 
secures product differentiation through high quality, close customer relationships and tailored 
solutions that meets individual needs. It is a leader in environmental friendly building 
solutions and has a strong position in precision tubing used in heat transfer in the automotive 
industry. Key points regarding extruded products are shown in table 4.6. 
Market sector Shipment Key characteristic Important customers 
Building and 
Construction 
50 % Leading on environmental friendly 
building solutions 
Own brands 
Transportation 33 % Strong position in precision tubing 
used in heat transfer 
Volkswagen, Denso, BMW, 
Delphi, TI and Valeo. 
Consumer Goods and 
Other 
17 % Mostly tailored - 
Table 4.6: Norsk Hydro extruded products data (Norsk Hydro, A2010). 
Norsk Hydro is ranked second in terms of electric power generation in Norway after Statkraft. 
It has long-term energy contracts provided by the government that expire in 2020, except for 
Sørdal’s contract that expires in 2012. Since the signing of these agreements the energy prices 
in Europe have risen due to the CO2 levy. About 1/3 of the energy price at Nord Pool is a result 
of the levy (Interviews Norsk Hydro, 31.3.11). The contract with Vattenfall to secure energy 
supply to the smelter in Søral from 2012 to 2020 is affected by the levy and is thus more 
expensive than the other contracts. Norsk Hydro claims the company can no longer invest in 
Norway or the rest of Europe if the government does not compensate for the CO2 levy when 
the contracts expire in 2020 (Økonomisk rapport, 31.3.11).  
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4.1.8 The Merger Endgame’s impact on Norsk Hydro 
Norsk Hydro is an underperformer in the highly concentrated Aluminum industry. The 
up/midstream part of the industry is entering the Balance and Alliance Stage while the 
competition is expected to increase downstream. The opportunities and threats implied by the 
Merger Endgame framework are listed in the SWOT in figure 4.30.  
 
Figure 4.30: Norsk Hydro’s SWOT. 
The ability to enter joint ventures will be increasingly important in up/midstream as the 
industry enters the Balance and Alliance Stage and the fundamentals of the industry change. 
Norsk Hydro is well positioned to benefit from this development being an attractive partner in 
upcoming joint ventures with global presence, backward integration with large reserves of 
resources, global leader in electrolysis technology, project management experience and strong 
focus on resmelting that will be increasingly important in the future. The company also has a 
history of joint ventures. Currently six of twelve primary smelters are joint ventures. 
In the Balance and Alliance Stage backward integration and resource control will become 
important. Norsk Hydro is well positioned in upstream and will become one of the few major 
suppliers of bauxite/alumina in the world with the integration and expansion of Vale’s assets 
in Brazil. Bauxite/alumina have no transparent worldwide prices and the high concentration in 
upstream with few suppliers compared to buyers implies that Norsk Hydro will have the 
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upper-hand in a bargaining position. The backward integration will generate growth in sales 
revenues from bauxite/alumina and might increase operating margins in midstream. 
Porter’s five forces reveal the threat of new entrants, especially in midstream. This is in line 
with the Merger Endgame that anticipates a deconsolidation during the Balance and Alliance 
Stage. Thus, Norsk Hydro must continue to focus on cost structure in order to stay globally 
competitive. The uncertainties regarding the future development of power regimes in Norway 
and EU are forcing Norsk Hydro to operate the German primary smelter Neuss on short-term 
energy contacts only (Interviews Norsk Hydro, 31.3.11). The high energy prices make it less 
cost efficient than Karmøy Søderberg that was shut down in 2009 and currently 78 % of the 
capacity is idle. The operating costs of the primary smelter Neuss is shown in figure 4.31. 
 
Figure 4.31: Operating costs of selected primary smelters (Norsk Hydro, A2008). 
EU will present guidance for how each country can indirectly or directly compensate for the 
CO2 levy in order to prevent carbon leakage in 2013 (Interviews Norsk Hydro, 31.3.11). The 
situation in Germany is special as the power prices are high compared to the rest of the world, 
even with compensation for the CO2 levy. With the rapidly expansion of primary aluminum 
capacity by low-cost producers in India, China and the Middle-East the Neuss smelter will 
most likely struggle to compete and stay idle over long periods due to unprofitability. The 
best strategic option seems to be to replace the primary smelter with low energy-intensive 
resmelters and shipping from Qatalum or other primary smelters located in Norway. 
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The production in Norway will most likely continue. Some uncertainty remains regarding the 
expiration of the Norwegian primary smelters’ power contracts in 2020 but the Norwegian 
government is currently agreeing on following EU’s directions in 2013 and compensate for 
the CO2 levy (Interviews Norsk Hydro, 31.3.11). This compensation will maintain the 
Norwegian smelters’ global competiveness. The Norwegian government is also a major 
stockholder that will strive to keep production in Norway. Altogether, the future of primary 
production in Norway looks promising despite some degree of uncertainty. 
Porter’s five forces reveal intense rivalry downstream and the Merger Endgame shows a 
deconsolidation that may increase this rivalry in the future. Norsk Hydro has a strong position 
within rolled products in Europe and is positioned for further growth in emerging markets 
within extruded products (Interviews Norsk Hydro, 31.3.11). It has penetrated China and 
Brazil with unique, high-end extruded products and brands within construction and 
automotive. The resmelter in Taiwan secures a steady supply of extrusion ingots to Chinese 
extruders, keeping the operation costs low. The company’s strategy in downstream is organic 
growth and the most efficient way to expand in the emerging markets is by leveraging on 
excising customers in Europe and the US that have operations abroad. It is in general difficult 
to predict how the increased rivalry will affect Norsk Hydro’s current positions downstream. 
Norsk Hydro has demerged and sold several downstream operations. It now has the option to 
demerge downstream operations further. Operations in up/midstream and downstream do not 
create any operational synergies and the only benefit by having downstream integrated is that 
it stabilizes the cash flow. The question is if the CEO can build top performers within almost 
unrelated business areas that rely on different skills. Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2002) show 
that resources in conglomerates tend to move from profitable to less profitable divisions. The 
result is a suboptimal use of resources that reduces the value of the company. Norsk Hydro’s 
value chain however, is loosely connected with internal transactions of resources. The price of 
primary aluminum at the LME for instance, is used as a reference point between midstream 
and downstream transactions. This solution is healthy for the profitability and reduces the 
likelihood of a suboptimal use of resources. However, it also undermines the benefits of a 
fully integrated value chain as downstream functions must pay the same as the competitors.  
A more severe threat is the combination of Norsk Hydro’s large expansion in up/midstream 
and the expected increased rivalry in downstream that will require quicker response to market 
changes by the management in both business areas. This is in line with Penrose (1959) who 
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considers the growth of the firm as limited only in the long-run by its internal management 
resources. This was the case for Norsk Hydro in 2002 when the management was forced to 
decline a relatively attractive investment in a primary smelter on Iceland due to the 
acquisition of the German Aluminum company VAW and other projects (Grimsrud and 
Kvinge, 2006). In the perspective of the stockholders the company will utilize its resources 
better by demerging downstream operations into independent units that respond quicker to 
market changes. The stockholders can hold shares in the downstream spin-offs in order to 
hedge against the more volatile cash flow from operations that is expected.  
From the perspective of the management the attractiveness of the solution may differ. 
According to Jensen (1986) managers have incentive to cause their firms to grow beyond 
optimal size. The reasons are increased power and the fact that compensation is positively 
correlated to growth in sales. In the case of spin-offs Norsk Hydro’s CEO will have his power 
decreased. However, if the CEO’s compensation is related to the stock market he will have 
increased incentive to act in the interest of the stockholders (Hillier, Grinblatt and Titman, 
2008). In 2010 the CEO at Norsk Hydro had a base salary of 5.65 million NOK (Norsk 
Hydro, A2010). His maximum annual bonus potential is 50 % of the base salary based on 
operative goals. No bonus was paid to the CEO in 2010. From 2011 30 % of the CEO’s 
annual base salary after tax must be invested in Norsk Hydro’s shares given the present year 
had a positive EBIT result. As the shares must be held for at least three years this latter 
compensation agreement creates a degree of long term incentives for the CEO. In general 
however, it is difficult to predict if these incentives are strong enough to make the CEO 
acknowledge a potential demerger that will reduce his power and influence over the company.   
Norsk Hydro serves mainly mature industries with slow growth prospects. The little 
geographical diversity was crucial during the economic downturn in the late 2000’s as the 
GDP growth fell in Europe and US. This is one of the reasons why the company 
underperformed in the period 2006 – 2010. The recent restructuring of operations to Brazil 
and Qatar will lead to a more stable cash flow. Norsk Hydro is also well positioned to assess 
value creation opportunities in many of the emerging markets and thereby stabilizing the cash 
flow further. However, this expansion abroad has increased the overall country risk for the 
company as operations in Brazil and Qatar are considerably more risky than those in Norway 
and Europe. This implies a higher required return on equity by the stockholders and a higher 
weighted average cost of capital for Norsk Hydro. This cost is not explicit and might lead to 
conflicts between stockholder and management in the pursuit of growth. 
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4.1.9 Conclusion and strategic overview  
The Merger Endgame implies that up/midstream is entering the Balance and Alliance Stage 
while downstream is deconsolidating. This has several implications for Norsk Hydro.  
Norsk Hydro has invested heavily up/midstream and is well positioned to face the change 
implied by the Merger Endgame. The company is considered a strong potential partner in 
upcoming joint ventures and can benefit from this when up/midstream enters the Balance and 
Alliance Stage where cooperation becomes increasingly important. However, the Merger 
Endgame’s expected deconsolidation during this stage implies that the rapidly primary 
aluminum capacity expansion now witnessed in low cost countries may continue. In order to 
stay globally competitive Norsk Hydro should phase out the costly primary smelter Neuss. 
In the perspective of the stockholders the combination of Norsk Hydro’s large expansion in 
up/midstream and an expected increase in rivalry downstream makes it highly uncertain if the 
management has the capacity to build top-performs within these two business areas which 
rely on different skills. The greatest value creation opportunity is therefore to further demerge 
downstream operations into independent units that respond quicker to market changes and is 
better suited to face the increased competition. This change can become controversial as the 
managements’ incentives might not coincide with the stockholders’ in this case. 
Norsk Hydro’s expansion in unstable countries implies a higher average weighted cost of 
capital as the country specific risk increases. This cost is not explicit and might lead to 
conflict between stockholder and management in the pursuit of growth in Asia and South-
America. Strategic markets will continue to be Europe and the US but Qatalum will make 
Asia and especially China an important part of the future’s revenues. In Asia and South-
America downstream growth can be achieved by product differentiation and leverage on 
existing customer relations. This holds especially true for extruded products.  
4.2 The Paper industry 
The Paper industry belongs to the sector Paper & Paper Products. It is a global industry that 
consists of several listed and non-listed companies. The largest paper producers are 
multinational with production facilities around the world.  
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4.2.1 Product characteristics 
Paper is a thin, versatile material attracted from fibers in wood (Norske Skog, A2010). It is 
mainly used for writing upon, printing or for packaging. Paper is recyclable. The fibers can 
typically be recycled five to seven times before they become too short to be recycled again. 
4.2.2 Applications 
There are more than 5,000 products made from paper and papermaking by-products that serve 
a wide range of different consumer industries (A.T. Kearney, 2007). The major business 
segments are fine paper, packaging and household goods. Fine paper involves paper for 
writing and printing, newsprint for newspapers, magazines, books and special paper. 
Packaging involves paperboard that is used to protect consumer and industrial goods. 
Examples of household goods are toilet paper, tissues and birthday cards.  
4.2.3 Value chain breakdown  
The Paper industry’s value chain can be structured as shown in figure 4.32.  
 
Figure 4.32: The Paper industry’s value chain (A.T. Kearney, 2007). 
In the first phase of paper production hard- and softwood from the forest owners or wasted 
paper are collected (A.T. Kearney, 2007). Softwoods have longs fibers and are suited for 
rough products, while hardwoods have short fibers and are suited for products with a smooth 
surface. Many products are a blend between both hard and soft wood. 
In the second phase pulp is made in pulp mills. The cellulose fibers in the wood or wasted 
paper are separated from each other through either a mechanical or a chemical pulping 
process. These pulp methods are not substitutes but complements in papermaking. 
The most common type of chemical pulping is the Kraft process. This process consists of a 
high temperature chemical bath with strong bases (like alkaline solutions) and sodium sulfide 
that dissolve the material. The method produces pulp with strong fibers and a wide range of 
fiber sources can be used, for example all types of wood and some non-wood species like 
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bamboo and kenaf. In this method less than 50 % of the tree is used. The pulp can be bleached 
with chlorine compounds, depending on the end-product’s requirements. 
Traditional mechanical pulping involves physically shredding trees into pulp with grind 
stones. New mechanical pulping methods are more efficient. In thermomechanical pulping the 
wood chips are squeezed between two revolving disks under high temperature and pressure, 
while chemi-thermomechanical pulping uses mild chemicals which increase pulp brightness 
and reduce shive content. Mechanical pulping uses about 90 % of the tree but the pulp has 
weak fibers that tend to discolor over time. It can be bleached but not to a great extent. 
Wasted paper is turned into deinked pulp in a deinking process where printing inks and other 
unwanted elements are removed by chemicals. 
 
Figure 4.33: The making of paper (A.T. Kearney analysis, 2007). 
In the third phase pulp is turned into paper in paper mills. Papermaking consists of 
preparation, forming, pressing and drying. The most energy intensive processes are 
preparation and drying. Bleached Kraft pulp is used to make high quality paper where 
strength, whiteness and resistance to yellowing are important. Mechanical pulp is used to 
create mechanical paper that relies on high ink absorbency and compressibility. 
Wood-free paper has high quality and is mainly made by Kraft pulp. Typical end-products are 
annual reports, laser print paper, high quality magazines, book publishing, brochures and 
direct mail advertising. Mechanical paper has lower quality and is mainly made by 
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mechanical and deinked pulp. Typical end-products are newspapers and newspaper 
supplements, paper towels, low quality magazines and catalogs. In the process the paper can 
be coated by a compound to impart certain qualities such as surface gloss, smoothness or 
reduced ink absorbency. Special paper is made by Kraft pulp and filler coating. 
In the fourth phase the paper is sold directly or through paper merchants to printers, 
publishers, converters, resellers or corporations. The process is summarized in figure 4.33. 
4.2.4 Cost drivers 
The Paper industry is capital intensive. A modern paper machine with a yearly 300,000 – 
500,000 tonnes capacity costs 200 – 500 million to install and takes roughly three years to set 
up (Thollander and Ottosson, 2007). 
Production disruptions are also costly. 
A paper producer, like Norske Skog, 
has around 25 % fixed and 75 % 
variable costs (Norske Skog, Seminar 
report 7.4.11). Figure 4.34 shows the 
cost structure in the production of 
paper. Key input factors are energy, 
wood, recovered paper, pulp and 
chemicals. The remaining costs are 
distribution, labor and other costs. 
The Paper industry is energy intensive 
and energy contributes with around 24 
% of the total production costs. Other significant costs are the pulp bought on the marketplace 
and the raw material used to make pulp, such as wood, recycled paper and chemicals. 
The largest forest areas are found in Russia, Brazil, Cananda, the US, China, Australia, 
Congo, Indonesia, Peru and India (FAFO report, 2005). These ten countries account for 66 % 
of the world’s total forest area of 3,953 million ha. Further details are shown in figure 4.35. 
Figure 4.34: Cost structure in the Paper industry (Norske 
Skog, Seminar report 7.4.11). 
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However, there is variation in both energy and 
wood used in papermaking depending on the 
pulp used. Chemical pulping uses twice as 
much wood per tonne than mechanical pulping 
but is self-sufficient in its energy consumption 
as half of the wood is dissolved and used as 
fuel in the chemical recovery phase (Szabo 
et.al., 2009). Mechanical pulping uses wood 
very efficiently but at the expense of a much 
higher electricity consumption. Recovered 
paper pulping uses only a fraction of the 
energy compared to the other pulping methods. 
There are certain ways to cut costs throughout 
the value chain. Energy can be produced by chemicals from the Kraft pulping and from waste 
such as wood and paper from the paper mills (Szabo et.al., 2009). The heat produced by 
mechanical pulping can be used as drying steam in paper processing. 
As wood, pulp and recovered paper have a fairly low value-to-weight production location is 
determined by access to fiber resources (Barr, 2006). The cost structure depends on 
processing options, labor wages, energy prices and access to raw material. 
4.2.5 Supply and demand by nations 
In order to understand the fundamentals of the Paper industry and the most important markets, 
it is necessary to study the supply and demand of paper in different regions. 
North America, Europe and Asia are the largest consumers of paper (Szabo et.al., 2009). In 
2004 these regions accounted for more than 90 % of the total paper and paperboard 
consumption of 360 million tonnes, with almost equal shares amongst them. All together 
Oceania, Africa and Latin America accounted for less than 8 % this year. 
Europe, North-America and Asia’s demand for fine paper, excluding packaging and 
household goods, is shown in figure 4.36. Fine paper has struggled with decreasing demand in 
Western-Europe and the US the last years, while the demand in Asia and especially in China 
has increased (UMP, Presentation 10.3.11). In 2010 the world’s fine paper capacity was 158 
million tonnes, while the demand was 137 million. 
Figure 4.35: Largest forest areas in the world 
(FAFO report, 2005). 
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Figure 4.36: Fine paper demand in Europe, North-America and Asia (UMP, Presentation 10.3.11). 
Since the 1990’s the paper producers in Western Europe have struggled with decreasing 
demand, overcapacity and unsustainable prices in several product segments (A.T. Kearney, 
2007). Figure 4.37 shows the capacity utilization and supply and demand for graphic paper, a 
segment that includes newsprint, magazine and books, in Western-Europe from 1990 to 2006. 
The tendency is that newcomers enter the market or paper manufactures invest in new 
capacity in times of high utilization and prices, thereby triggering a new cycle of oversupply. 
 
Figure 4.37: Capacity utilization and graphic paper supply and demand in Western-Europe 1990 – 
2006 (A.T. Kearney, 2007). 
The export of fine paper from America, Europe, Asia & Oceania and Africa are modest 
compared to the overall production. In 2010 Europe was the world’s largest net exporter of 
fine paper and exported 6.3 million tonnes or 12.6 % of the total production of 50 million 
(UMP, Presentation 10.3.11). The net export to Asia & Oceania was 3.2 (3.7 – 0.5) in 2010, 
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down from 3.3 (3.6 – 0.3) in 2006. The net export to America was 1.8 (2.6 – 0.8) in 2010, 
down from 2.7 (3.4 – 0.7) in 2006. The relatively low export compared to the overall 
production indicates that the Paper industry has a strong local focus. 
4.2.6 The outside-in analysis 
The Paper industry is moderately concentrated.10 The CR3 was 35.4 % in 2010, up from 33.3 
% in 2006. However, for companies such as Norske Skog that are involved in newsprint and 
magazine paper the concentration is higher. In 2010 the CR3 was 47 %.  
 
Figure 4.38: The Paper industry plotted on the s-curve. 
For several years the dominant strategy within the Paper industry has been to construct large 
paper mills that are able to utilize economies of scale. In the period 1991 – 2006 the number 
of mills has been reduced in countries within the Confederation of Europe Paper Industries 
(CEPI) while the production has increased (A.T. Kearney, 2007). The development of paper 
mill size from 1991 to 2006 is shown in figure 4.39.  
However, since the beginning of the 1990’s the Paper industry has struggled with decreasing 
demand, overcapacity and unsustainable low prices in several product segments. Especially in 
Europe the low prices have forced companies to focus on internal processes. Several 
companies have created spin-offs and demerged divisions in order to become more 
                                                           
10
 An overview of analyzed companies and calculations of the s-curve and CAGR growth portfolio 2006 – 2010 
are presented in appendix A.4. 
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specialized. Svenska Cellulosa Aktiebolaget (SCA) for instance, has invested heavily in tissue 
making since 2007 and reduced its position in packaging (SCA, A2007 – 2010). Norske Skog 
has sold non-newsprint mills, power stations, forest properties and invested nearly 9.3 billion 
in newsprint from the beginning of 2000 (Norske Skog, A2000 – 2010). 
 
Figure 4.39: Number of paper mills and paper production in CEPI countries (A.T. Kearney, 2007) 
The moderate concentration level, positive consolidation direction and increased internal 
focus indicate that the Paper industry has passed the Merger Endgame’s Scale Stage and has 
now entered the Focus Stage, as shown in figure 4.38. 
4.2.6.1 Porter’s five forces and PESTEL 
The Paper industry is analyzed with Porter’s five forces and the PESTEL framework. 
RIVALRY AMONG EXISTING FIRMS 
There are a variety of business models in the Paper industry. Fully integrated companies such 
as UPM/Myllykoski and SCA are involved in wood, pulp and paper making, while others are 
specialized. Norske Skog is specialized in newsprint and magazine paper, CSS in greeting 
cards, Nordbord in wood products and Fibria Celulose in wood and pulp. A full overview and 
description of the companies in the Paper industry is presented in appendix A.4. 
The performance of the industry from 2006 to 2010 is shown in figure 4.40 and 4.41. In figure 
4.40 bubble size is adjusted market cap for 2010, while it is revenues in figure 4.41. The 
industry’s CAGR for adjusted market cap in the period 2006 to 2010 is nearly – 1 %. The 
value has declined from 294,403 to 282,150 million. The CAGR for revenues is 
approximately 1.7 %, whereas the value has grown from 165,181 to 176,356 million.  
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Figure 4.40: Performance in the Paper industry 2006 – 2010. Value growth is CAGR of 
adjusted market cap 2006-2010. Bubble size is adjusted market cap in 2010. 
 
Figure 4.41: Performance in the Paper industry from 2006 – 2010. Value growth is CAGR of 
adjusted market cap 2006-2010. Bubble size is revenues in 2010. 
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DS Smith, Burgo and Kimberly-Clark dominate the industry in size. DS Smith is involved in 
packaging and fine paper for the office. Burgo is involved in magazine paper, fine paper, 
printing paper and household. Kimberly-Clark is involved in household goods. All three have 
shown a growth around the industry’s average, measured in CAGR, from 2006 to 2010. 
Among the companies that serve the newsprint and/or magazine segments Newpage, SCA and 
AbiBow are value growers, Nippon and Sappi are simple growers, and UMP/Myllukoski, 
Stora Enso, Holmen, OJI Paper, Norske Skog and Catalyst are underperformers. The greatest 
value grower overall is the Brazilian Fibria Celulose that is specialized in wood and pulp. 
The revenue growth in the Focus Stage spans from 0 % to 30 % according to the Merger 
Endgame research, with an average of 8.8 %. The range in the Paper industry from 2006 to 
2010 is – 10.1 % to 32.8 %, with an average close to 1.7 %. The average operating income 
margin is lower than expected in both in 2006 and 2010. In the Focus Stage the operating 
margin spans from 3 % to 15 % according to the research, whereas the average operating 
margin spans from 7 % to 12 %. In 2006 the range was – 16.8 % to 22.7 % for the industry 
with an average of 5.4 %. In 2010 it was – 33.8 % to 35.4 % with an average of 6.5 %.  
Companies that serve the newsprint and/or magazine segments offer lower average operating 
margins than the industry overall. In 2006 the average operating margin was 1.7 % and in 
2010 it was 2.6 %. Catalyst and Norske Skog serve this segment and both showed negative 
operating margins in 2006 and 2010. Norske Skog owned around 35 % of Catalyst’s shares 
from the beginning of 2000 but sold out in 2005 (Norske Skog, A2006). 
Since the 1990’s the Paper industry has become global and the competition has increased as a 
consequence of this change (Norske Skog, Annual meeting 2003). The Paper industry is 
capital intensive throughout the value chain, from operations within wood, pulp and paper 
manufacturing. The production technology is based on well known principles and available 
technology (Szabo et.al., 2009). Nonetheless, there is still focus on innovation that can 
improve product quality, optimize production efficiency and increase the scale. In the industry 
it is crucial to have economies of scale. In Scandinavia for instance, newsprint machines 
narrower than seven meter wide were not considered competitive in 2000. The state of the art 
machines at the time were ten meters wide with a speed around 1800 m/min.  
The companies that operate at the beginning of the value chain in Paper industry deal with 
commodities like wood and pulp. This means that the chances of passing costs through to the 
customer or achieving above industry profit by product differentiation are strictly limited. In 
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the production of paper there is a great diversity of different paper types in terms of quality 
and user needs. Most of these are, however, commodities that are classified by grades 
(Conservatree, 26.4.11). The greatest possibilities for product differentiation and customer 
lock-ins seem to be within household goods and fine paper. CSS for instance, specializes in 
greeting cards and is capable of achieving product differentiation (Szabo et.al., 2009). 
The increased competition and limited possibilities for product differentiation have put 
pressure on production costs. Most of the European paper manufactures have started 
operations in South-America, Australia, Tasmania and New Zealand (Norske Skog, Annual 
meeting 2003). The reason is that the wood in these regions can be harvested after 20 years, 
while it takes 90 – 100 years in Russia, Scandinavia and Canada. The use of recovered paper 
in paper production has also increased in order to reduce costs. 
 
Figure 4.42: UPM’s  acquisition of Myllykoski (UMP, Presentation 10.3.11).  
The Paper industry is known to be highly cyclical (Szabo et.al., 2009). The analysis of the 
industry reveals that most of the companies that have performed close to average are not 
specialized but involved in several aspects of the value chain. On the other hand, the largest 
underperformers Norske Skog and Catalyst, and the largest value grower Fibria Celulose, are 
all specialized. Norske Skog and Catalyst mainly serve the newsprint and magazine paper 
segments that have been struggling with falling demand from 2006 to 2010, while Fibria 
Celulose produces pulp that has experienced a price increase in the period.  
There has been a strong focus on scale in the industry from the early 1990’s, as stated in 
figure 4.39. However, in recent years there have been examples of acquisitions in order to 
control the supply side in the industry. When UPM acquired Myllykoski for 900 million EUR 
in December 2010, the market cap of Norske Skog increased by 7.4 % due to a sign of 
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possible decrease on the supply side of newsprint and magazine paper (DN, 26.4.11). UMP 
however explains the acquisition by annual synergy benefits exceeding 100 million EUR from 
2012 onwards that will mainly come from cost reduction and improved efficiency (UMP, 
Presentation 10.3.11). Figure 4.42 shows the logic behind the acquisition. 
The rivalry is intense in the Paper industry due to overcapacity within several segments in 
mature markets and strictly limited possibilities for above industry average profits by product 
differentiation. The result is lower operating margins than expected by the Merger Endgame. 
DETERMINANTS OF SUPPLIER POWER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The average raw material consumption and energy consumption structure for CEPI countries 
are shown in figure 4.43 and 4.44 accordingly. The most important raw materials are pulp, 
recovered paper and energy. Recovered paper and pulp both account for 42 % each of the raw 
material used in the average paper manufacturing in the CEPI countries (CEPI stat, 26.4.11). 
Biomass accounts for nearly 50 % of the energy used in paper manufacturing on average.  
UPM, Abibow and Stora Enso are the three largest companies measured in newsprint and 
magazine paper capacity, as shown in figure 4.45 (Norske Skog, Seminar report 7.4.11). 
Norske Skog is ranked as number four in total capacity. The top three have a nearly 75 % 
share in newsprint in North-America and nearly 60 % in Western-Europe. They also have a 
share above 60 % in coated and uncoated magazine paper in both regions. UPM dominates in 
magazine paper capacity in Western-Europe after the acquisition of Myllykoski, as shown in 
Figure 4.43: Raw material consumption 
structure in CEPI (CEPI stats, 26.4.11) 
Figure 4.44: Energy consumption in CEPI 
(CEPI stats, 26.4.11) 
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figure 4.46 (Norske Skog, Seminar report 7.4.11). In newsprint, however, the position is 
somewhat weaker: UPM has 26 % share, Stora Enso 21 % and Norske Skog 14 %. 
 
Figure 4.45: The largest global companies within newsprint and magazine paper (Norske Skog, 
Seminar report 7.4.11). 
 
Figure 4.46: Capacity share in Western-Europe (Norske Skog, Seminar report 7.4.11) 
All the three major players – UPM, Abibow and Stora Enso – are backward integrated with 
large wood reserves (Szabo et.al., 2009). They are traders of wood, pulp and biomass and do 
not rely on suppliers. In 2010 pulp was the largest contributor to total revenues for UPM and 
compensated to a certain degree for falling revenues in fine paper (UPM, A2010). 
Norske Skog and Catalyst do not own large forest reserves. Norske Skog does not operate 
with long term contracts on recovered paper or pulp, and thus relies on spot market prices 
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(Norske Skog, Seminar report 7.4.11). Figure 4.47 and 4.48 show that the spot prices for 
recovered paper and pulp are volatile and that both have shown an upwards going trend since 
the 1980’s. The price increases have put pressure on Norske Skog and Catalyst’s operating 
margins – that are at the same time pressured by falling demand and declining sales. 
 
Figure 4.47: Price of recovered newspapers in Germany in EUR/tonne (Norske Skog, Seminar 
report 7.4.11). 
 
Figure 4.48: Price of pulp in Canada and Western-Europe in USD/tonne (Norske Skog, 
Seminar report 7.4.11). 
The price of recovered paper and pulp tend to adjust to the demand of produced paper. If the 
paper manufactures do not sell, they will end up with full inventories. This will then reduce 
the demand and put downward pressure on the prices. However, especially pulp is a diverse 
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product with several applications that also serves other industries (Norske Skog, A2007). This 
puts upwards pressure on the demand side in general and also the price of pulp. 
Figure 4.49 shows the price for different 
types of fine paper in Europe. It is clear that 
the newsprint segment is the least attractive 
segment measured in price. With the 
assumption of somewhat equal amount and 
type of pulp in the production, the operating 
margin within newsprint is most exposed to 
the increasing fiber source costs. 
The companies that own wood resources 
have access to biomass. Others, like Norske 
Skog, have a mix between short, mid and 
long term energy contracts in the market 
place (Norske Skog, A2010). In general the 
supplier power is moderate in the Paper industry but it is more severe for companies like 
Norske Skog and Catalyst that are not backward integrated or own large forest reserves. 
THREAT OF SUBSTITUTES 
There are several substitutes within household goods and packaging (CPBIS report, 2007). 
Plastic, glass and metal can substitute paper packaging. However, paper is in many situations 
superior as it is relatively inexpensive, recyclable and more flexible. Within household goods 
products such as toilet paper and tissues have no good substitutes, while others, like greeting 
cards, can be substituted by electronic communication. In general the threat of substitutes 
seems only modest within household goods and packaging due to the papers’ characteristics.  
There are several substitutes in the newsprint and magazine paper segments (CPBIS report, 
2007). Especially electronic communication, such as TV, radio and the Internet, is reducing 
the demand for newsprint. This trend is shown in figure 4.50. The demand for newsprint is 
shrinking drastically in North-America, while it is decreasing slower in Europe (Norske Skog, 
Seminar report 7.4.11). The reason is that Europe has a strong tradition for newspaper reading 
and a strong subscriber base compared to North-America. The drop in demand for magazine 
paper is smaller than for paper in both Europe and North-America, as shown in figure 4.51. 
Figure 4.49: Price of different types of fine paper 
in EUR/tonne in Europe (UMP, A2010). 
64 
 
The threat of substitutes is immense in the newsprint and magazine paper segments 
considering the significant drop in demand both in Europe and North America. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.50: Demand for newsprint in Europe and North-America (Norske Skog, Seminar report 
7.4.11). 
 
Figure 4.51: Demand for magazine paper in Europe and North-America (Norske Skog, Seminar 
report 7.4.11). 
The threat of substitutes is immense in the newsprint and magazine paper segments but seems 
more moderate within household goods and packaging. 
THREAT OF NEW ENTRANTS 
The trend in the industry is to penetrate markets by physical presence rather than reliance on 
shipping due to the generally low value-to-weight ratio for paper. It is possible for newcomers 
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to enter most markets as the production technology is based on well known principles and is 
fairly available (Szabo et.al., 2009). However, this seems unlikely within the paper segments 
that are struggling with overcapacity in the mature markets. The current price levels are too 
low to justify the large investments needed. Packaging and consumer goods on the other hand 
offer higher prices and it is more likely that newcomers will enter within these segments.   
In general newcomers will most likely seek emerging markets where the supply and demand 
is more balanced. In emerging markets such as China, India and Brazil the paper capacity has 
expanded during the last years in order to meet increased demand (CEPI stats, 26.4.11). 
Capacity expansion in the period 1994 to 2004 is shown in figure 4.52.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.52: Percentage capacity increase in selected countries (CEPI stats, 26.4.11) 
As long as there is overcapacity in the mature markets it seems unlikely that newcomers will 
seek presentation in these regions. A larger threat, shown several times throughout the last 20 
years, is that already established players expand their capacity when the prices finally rise and 
thereby trigger a new cycle of overcapacity. Nonetheless, new entrants in emerging markets 
with sustainable demand such as India may rise. 
DETERMINANTS OF BUYER POWER 
The CR3 estimates show that the concentration is moderate for the paper producers. Their 
ability to control the supply side is limited and explains why oversupply is a major problem in 
the industry. The concentration of customers in general is less concentrated than the paper 
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producers (Szabo et.al., 2009). As a consequence the buyer power is modest as the customers 
are not able control or manipulate the demand side. 
The customer loyalty is in general limited and there are examples of customers leveraging 
their inventory capacity by increasing stocks at lower prices and reducing stocks as prices 
increase (A.T. Kearney, 2007). However, the buyer power can be reduced by the industry’s 
few niche producers that are able to create customer lock-ins through product differentiation. 
 
Figure 4.53: Spot price of newsprint in Europe and the US (Norske Skog, Seminar report 7.4.11). 
An indirect part of buyer power is hedging. Several tactics are used in order to secure a 
predictable revenue stream. UPM is well product diversified and is involved in pulp, energy 
and paper products that stabilize the cash flow (UPM, A2010). The company also operates 
with a mix of three, six and twelve-month contracts on their products. Norske Skog on the 
other hand is more exposed to the volatility in the spot market. The company is not well 
product diversified and mostly operates with three month contracts on their products (Norske 
Skog, Seminar report 7.4.11). The volatility of newsprint in Germany and the US is shown in 
figure 4.53. A related risk is currency movements. As commodities are priced in U.S. dollars 
(or EUR) currency movements can have a significant impact on short-term profitability. 
In general the buyer power is moderate in the Paper industry but can be reduced by niche 
companies that are able to create customer lock-ins through product differentiation. 
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4.2.6.2 Summary and overview of industry trends 
The Porter’s five forces show that the Paper industry is not an attractive industry. The created 
value is leaked to product substitutes and limited possibilities for product differentiation 
produce an intense rivalry that is further amplified by overcapacity in several paper segments. 
As a consequence the operating margins are lower than anticipated by the Merger Endgame.  
The Paper industry’s main threat is continued overcapacity in segments like newsprint and 
magazine paper in the mature markets that will keep the industry’s future profitability low. 
Figure 4.54 summarizes the Porter’s five forces analysis. 
 
Figure 4.54: Porter’s five forces for the Paper industry. 
The Paper industry has entered the Focus Stage in the Merger Endgame framework. This 
means that companies now must focus less on scale and rely more on internal process 
improvements in order to stay competitive. It also means that the industry will continue to 
consolidate but at a slower speed. The declining speed is bad news for companies involved in 
paper segments that are experiencing overcapacity as a further consolidation within these 
segments can increase the control over the supply and put upwards pressure on the prices. 
An industry trend is that the demand of fine paper is expected to shift to emerging markets. 
Figure 4.55 shows UPM’s outlooks for the fine paper demand. In North-America and Europe 
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the demand will continue to decline, while it will increase in China and other emerging 
markets (UMP, Presentation 10.3.11). The trend for European paper manufactures is to 
penetrate emerging markets by investing in physical assets in these regions. 
 
Figure 4.55: Outlook for demand of fine paper (UMP, Presentation 10.3.11). 
It is difficult to predict the price developments within the industry due to the high volatility. 
On short to midterm the outlook for the newsprint and magazine paper prices are positive 
(UMP, Presentation 10.3.11). The upwards going price trend for recovered paper is expected 
to continue due to cost and environmental advantages. Prices of pulp, wood and chemicals are 
difficult to predict even on short term but has shown an upwards going price trend. 
4.2.7 Presentation of Norske Skog 
In this section Norske Skog is first presented and then assessed in the light of the outside-in 
analysis and the Merger Endgame framework. 
PRESENTATION 
Norske Skog is listed on Oslo Stock Exchange under the ticker NSG (Norske Skog, A2010). 
It was founded in 1962 and is headquartered in Lysaker, Norway. It employs 5 300 people 
and operates in Europe, South-America, Asia and Oceania. Sven Ombudstvedt became new 
CEO in January 2010. The company has no controlling shareholder. 
In the end of 2010 the company had a book value of total assets of 5.59 billion financed with 
35 % equity. At 1.5.11 the company had a trailing P/B of 0.28.  
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LATEST DEVELOPMENT 
In the late 1990’s Norske Skog increased its focus on newsprint and magazine paper. It has 
invested nearly 9.3 billion in newsprint in Europe, Asia, Oceania and South-America (Norske 
Skog, A2000 – 2010) since 2000. At the same time it sold non-newsprint mills, power 
stations, forest properties and other non-core activities. Norske Skog is currently involved in 
newsprint, magazine paper and energy to some limited extent. 
In 2007 the company nearly went bankrupt due to several years of oversupply and low prices 
within the newsprint segment. The company still struggles financially and is forced to sell 
assets in order to pay back debt. The last few years have been dominated by asset sales and 
closure of operations. The company has also kept a low investment level in this time period. 
As the industry moves through the Focus Stage, Norske Skog is already focusing on core 
operations with a strict cost reduction program. However, the company seems to have limited 
its own competitiveness in the industry by relying solely on newsprint and magazine paper. 
RECENT PERFORMANCE 
Norske Skog’s recent performance is shown in figure 4.56 (Netfonds, 2.5.11). The business 
has not been profitable in the period 2006 to 2010. Turmoil in the world economy led to weak 
demand for paper throughout 2008 to 2010 and further reduced the revenues. 
 
Figure 4.56: Market performance 17.9.97 – 2.5.11 in NOK (Netfonds, 2.5.11). 
As stated Norske Skog has underperformed in the period 2006 to 2010 compared to the 
industry overall. The average operating income margin for companies that serve the newsprint 
and/or magazine segments was 1.7 % in 2006 and 2.6 % in 2010. Norske Skog’s 
corresponding operating margins were – 9 % and – 12.8 %. The company’s net income 
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margins in the same period were – 13 % and – 10.5 %. Figure 4.57 shows Norske Skog’s 
revenues, EBIT and earnings from 2006 to 2010.  
 
Figure 4.57: Performance 2006 – 2010 in billions (Norske Skog, A2010). 
DEBT SITUATION 
Norske Skog’s current credit ratings are B- by S&P and B2 by Moody’s with negative 
outlooks (Norske Skog, A2010). These evaluations, done in 2008, imply that bonds issued by 
the company are highly speculative. The loan portfolio is shown in figure 4.58. At the end of 
2010 Norske Skog had approximately 832 million (4.4 billion NOK) in cash. 
 
Figure 4.58: Norske Skog’s loan portfolio in million NOK (Norske Skog, A2010). 
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Norske Skog’s issued bonds are shown in table 4.7. The interest rates reflect that the status is 
“junk”, whereas the highest is 15.5 %. All the bonds are senior unsecured. 
Maturity Currency Cupon Original amount  Outstanding amount  
Oct ’11 US$ 7.625 % $ 600 mn $ 285 mn 
Oct ’15 US$ 6.125 % $ 200 mn $ 171 mn 
Oct ’33 US$ 7.125 % $ 200 mn $ 200 mn 
          
Jun ’17 EUR 7.000 % € 500 mn € 493 mn 
          
Mar ’12 NOK (NSG 16) N3m + 1.05% NOK 1,100 mn NOK 655 mn 
Jun ’14 NOK (NSG 17) 15.50 % NOK 530 mn NOK 520 mn 
Jun ’14 NOK (NSG 18) N3m + 11.5% NOK 220 mn NOK 210 mn 
Oct ’14 NOK (NSG 15) 5.40 % NOK 300 mn NOK 195 mn 
Table 4.7: Norske Skog’s issued bonds (Norske Skog, A2010). N3m is three months Nibor. 
The 400 million EUR bank loan that matures in 2012 involves several banks, listed in table 
4.8. The loan is most likely secured as financial covenants for it are net equity11 of more than 
nine billion NOK (10.18 billion NOK per 31 December 2010) and gearing below 1.4.   
Bank  Amount (EUR) Bank Amount (EUR) 
SEB (agent)                 28.75 HSH Nordbank                 21.50 
Danske Bank                 28.75 JP Morgan                 21.50 
ING                 28.75 Nordea                 21.50 
RBS                 28.75 Unicredit                 21.50 
BNPParibas                 21.50 Banco Itau                 14.00 
Citigroup                 21.50 Bayern LB                 14.00 
DBS                 21.50 HSBC                 14.00 
Deutsche Bank                 21.50 NATEXIS                  14.00 
DnBNOR                 21.50 Westpac                 14.00 
Handelsbanken                 21.50 Total                 400.00 
Table 4.8: Norske Skog’s bank loan in million EUR (Norske Skog, A2010). 
As of December 2010 Norske Skog has interest-bearing non-current liabilities of 2.22 billion 
(11,717 million NOK) and interest-bearing current liabilities of 369.5 million (1,954 million 
NOK). This gives a net interest-bearing debt of 1.75 billion (9,271 million NOK). The book 
                                                           
11
 Net equity is defined as equity minus intangible assets. 
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value of equity excluded minority interest in the end of 2010 was 1.92 billion (10,161 million 
NOK). This gives a gearing of 0.91. With hedge reserves and fair value hedge into account, 
the level of gearing is reduced to 0.87. 
Norske Skog faces large debt repayments in 2011 and 2012, of 1.954 and 3.84 billion NOK, 
as shown in figure 4.58. Interest payments and income aside, the current 4.4 billion NOK in 
cash is 1.394 billion less than what is needed to cover the debt payments in 2012 after the debt 
is paid for in 2011. The most likely scenario is that the 400 million EUR bank loan is 
refinanced within 2012. This loan is assumed secured and is prioritized before the other non-
secured senior debt in case of bankruptcy and liquidation. As of December 2010 the company 
has total non-current assets of 19,271 million NOK in book value, whereas 15,909 million is 
property, plant and equipment. Most of the latter is related to paper mills. The total current 
assets less cash and cash equivalents are 10,027 million in book value. It is difficult to 
estimate the market value of the paper mills but with the assumption that the current assets 
excluded for cash can be transformed into cash (inventories, receivables and other current 
assets), this alone is around 10,027 million NOK or 1,266 million EUR. Thus, Norske Skog 
will most likely be able to refinance within 2012 as the banks can secure their loans.12 
OPERATIONS AND ASSETS 
Norske Skog is not a significant forest owner (Norske Skog, A2010). It owns forest in 
Australia and Brazil that contribute a small proportion of the wood consumed yearly. In the 
beginning of May 2011 the company announced that it is selling the forest in Brazil to 
Participacoes for 63.5 million in order to improve its financial situation (DN, 3.5.11). 
Norske Skog owns 14 wholly and partly-owned mills in 11 countries in Europe, Asia, 
Oceania and South-America (Norske Skog, A2010). Around 53 % of newsprint is 
manufactured in Europe, 29 % in Oceania, 10 % in South-America and nearly 7 % in Asia. 
All the magazine paper is produced in Europe. The paper mills are listed in table 4.9.  
Norske Skog has invested little in its paper mills compared to peers such as Stora Enso and 
Holmen the last years (DN, 22.1.11). The company also has the oldest paper machines 
compared to these companies. The paper machines located at the mills are product specific. 
                                                           
12
 At 27.5.11 it was announced that 140 million EUR are refinanced with DNB Nor, SEB, Nordea and Citibank 
(DN, 6.6.11 and Skog.no, 27.5.11). The loan has duration of three years and interest rate is set to 13 %.  
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However, it is possible to upgrade some of these to produce higher quality or other grades 
(Pulp and paper Canada, 2.5.11). Such upgrades require capital investments and industrial 
know-how. Potential re-use of excising equipment can reduce the required investments costs. 
Name and 
region 
Ownership 
(%) 
Newsprint  Uncoated 
magazine 
paper  
Coated 
Magazine 
paper  
Total 
capacity 
(adjusted)  
Skogn, Norway 100 560 - - 560 
Saubrugs, 
Norway 
100 - 545 - 545 
Follum, 
Norway 
100 150 - 140 290 
Golbey, France 100 620 - - 620 
Bruck, Austria 100 125 - 280 405 
Walsum, 
Germany 
100 - - 435 435 
Parenco, 
Netherlands 
100 125 140 - 265 
Total Europe - 1580 (53.5 %) 685 (100%) 855 (100%) 3120 (69.4 %) 
Albury, 
Australia 
100 280 - - 280 
Boyer, Autralia 100 270 - - 270 
Tasman, New-
Zealand 
100 315 - - 315 
Total Oceania - 865 (29.3 %) - - 865 (19.2 %) 
Pisa, Brazil 100 185 - - 185 
Bio Bio, Chile 100 125 - - 125 
Total South-
America 
- 310 (10.5 %) - - 310 (6.9%) 
Singburi, 
Thailand 
100 130 - - 130 
MNI, Malaysia 34 250 - - 70 
Total Asia 
(adjusted) 
- 200 (6.7 %)  - 200 (4.5%) 
Total capacity - 2955  685 855 4495 
Table 4.9: Overview of paper mills (Norske Skog, A2010). All figures in 000’ tonnes.  
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The book value of property, plant and equipment per region from 2007 to 2010 is shown in 
figure 4.59. In order to improve the financial situation Norske Skog has sold several mills in 
Asia during the last four years (Norske Skog, A2010). In 2008 it sold its activities in South 
Korea and in 2009 it divested its two mills in China. In Europe it has sold several properties, 
including the main office Oxenøen for 82 million in 2008. It has also sold several paper mills 
in this region, such as Steti in the Czech Republic. The net interest bearing debt was reduced 
by nearly one billion during 2008 and 2009. 
 
Figure 4.59: Book value of assets in billions in different regions 2007 – 2010 (Norske Skog, 
A2007-2010). 
PROFITABILITY OF OPERATIONS 
 
Figure 4.60: Revenues in billion by operations (Norske Skog, A2006-2010). 
Norske Skog’s revenues in the period 2006 to 2010 are shown in figure 4.60 (Norske Skog, 
A2010). Newsprint revenues are declining as a consequence of mill closures, weakened 
demand and lower prices. The revenues from magazine paper have been steady in the period. 
Revenues from sale of excess energy have risen as a result of the closure of a paper machine 
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at Norske Skog Follum in the summer of 2008 and the closure of Norske Skog Union in 2006. 
Due to a new contract structure with effect from the beginning of January 2011, the revenues 
from energy are expected to decline. Other activities involve corporate functions, real estate, 
trading and sorting of recovered paper, and purchase and resale of wood. 
 
Figure 4.61: Operating income margins in percent by operations (Norske Skog, A2006-2010). 
The operating margins for the two most important segments, newsprint and magazine paper, 
have in the period 2006 to 2010 been negative or close to zero, as shown in figure 4.61. 
OPERATING REVENUES BY REGION 
Norske Skog’s major customer base is found in Europe. This region made up 63 % of the 
operating revenues in 2010, as shown in figure 
4.62. North-America represented 4 %, South-
America 7 %, Oceania 3 %, Asia 3 % and 
Africa 1 %. The revenues have been stable the 
last three years, with the exception of Europe 
and Asia, where the revenues have declined as 
a consequence of mill closures, capacity 
reductions and asset sales. 
Figure 4.62: Operating revenues by region (Norske Skog, A2010). 
MARKET POSITION AND COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 
Norske Skog is not backward integrated (Norske Skog, A2010). The company therefore relies 
on contracts with third parties for energy, wood, pulp, chemicals and recovered paper.  
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The energy consumption in 2010 amounted to 15,400 GWh, where 8,800 GWh was 
electricity, 500 GWh self-generated heat energy and 6,100 GWh was purchased heat energy 
(Norske Skog, A2010). About 75 % of the electricity is purchased under long-term contracts, 
mainly in South-America, Oceania and Norway (Norske Skog, Q1 2011). The exposure to 
spot prices in the electricity market is mainly in continental Europe and Asia where the need 
for electricity is sparse due to an outspread use of recovered paper. As stated the revenues 
from sale of excess energy in Norway are not likely to continue due to new contracts in 2011. 
Norske Skog has long term contracts for wood at favorable prices in South-America and 
Oceania (Norske Skog, A2010). It has long term volume contracts in Norway. It is buying 
wood on the spot market in Asia and continental Europe but the mills in these regions rely 
mostly on recovered paper as stated earlier. The closure of mills in Asia and continental 
Europe has reduced Norske Skog’s exposure to the volatile but increasing price trend of 
recovered paper. Table 4.10 shows the mills where recovered paper is used in newsprint. 
Paper mill Recovered paper (%) 
Albury, Australia 33 
Bruck, Austria 92 
Golbey, France 62 
Praneco, Netherlands 100 
Skogn, Norway 33 
Singburi, Thailand 100 
Table 4.10: Recovered paper (in percent) used in newsprint (Norske Skog, A2010). 
Norske Skog buys chemicals and pulp at spot prices in the market place. Overall, Norske 
Skog believes that the expected price increases within newsprint and magazine paper will be 
offset by increased costs of input factors in 2011 (Norske Skog, Q1 2011). 
Norske Skog is a significant global producer within newsprint and magazine paper. It is 
number three in capacity for uncoated and number five in coated in Western-Europe. The 
main customer base for magazine paper is Europe. The revenues have been stable but the 
operating margins have been volatile and at times negative. 
Norske Skog is well positioned within newsprint in Oceania and South-America. It has long 
term contracts at favorable prices for wood and energy in both regions. In Oceania Norske 
Skog is the only local producer, with a high market share. It has long term volume contracts 
with pricing formula linked to USD and exports to Asian countries as well. In South-America 
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Norske Skog is the largest local producer. It has shown long term growth in this region and is 
exporting to North-America. The operating margins are the lowest in Asia (Norske Skog, Q1 
2011), and may have been the reason for the recent mill sales in the region. In Europe there 
are still signs of overcapacity within newsprint that may lead to further capacity closures.  
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Mill utilization 
(Production/ capacity) 
92 95 93 79 89 
Table 4.11: Mill utilization (in percent) (Norske Skog, A2010). 
The utilization of the mills has span from 79 % to 95 % in the period 2006 to 2010. It reached 
its second lowest in the period in 2010. Table 4.11 shows the utilization of the mills. 
3.2.8 The Merger Endgame’s impact on Norske Skog 
Norske Skog is an underperformer in the moderately concentrated Paper industry that has 
entered the Focus Stage. The opportunities and threats implied by the Merger Endgame are 
listed in the SWOT in figure 4.63.  
 
Figure 4.63: Norske Skog’s SWOT 
From the perspective of the stockholders the question is if Norske Skog should continue to 
operate or find a partner to consolidate. In the case of a bankruptcy the stockholders are 
ranked after the creditors and the outcome is highly uncertain considering the gearing of 0.91.  
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In the case of continued operations Norske Skog does not seem to possess any competitive 
advantages. It is specialized in the paper and magazine segments that are struggling with 
overcapacity in mature markets like Europe and North-America. In 2010 63 % of Norske 
Skog’s total revenues came from Europe and 4 % from North-America. The demand for 
newsprint in these regions is expected to decrease in the future. Norske Skog shares the high 
exposure to Europe with several competitors such as SCA (above 77 % of revenues from 
Europe in 2009), Stora Enso (above 83 % of revenues from Europe in 2009) and UPM (above 
73 % of revenues from Europe in 2009). However, these companies are backward integrated 
and product diversified. In this way the cost of input may be reduced and other products, such 
as pulp, can compensate for losses in the newsprint and/or magazine segments in periods. 
Norske Skog is experiencing financial distress and is selling non-core assets in order to reduce 
its debt level. It seems capable to meet its financial commitments in 2011 and 2012 but there 
is a substantial possibility of default in the future. The “junk” bonds reduce the cash flow 
from operations but also affect the company’s competiveness in several ways. The most 
severe weakness implied by the financial distress is the high weighted average cost of capital 
(Myers, 1977). The required return of debt is obvious and shown in the “junk” status of the 
bonds. However, the required return of equity has increased as well due to a more volatile 
market value of equity. The consequence is that the company will struggle to raise equity to 
invest in new market opportunities. For the moment the company’s competitiveness is 
minimized due to limited possibilities to invest beyond fundamental maintenance. Myers 
(1977) also addresses the short horizon problem: At this point equity holders have a tendency 
to pass up positive NPV- projects that pay off over a long time horizon in favor of projects 
with less positive NPV that pay off faster. Another indirect bankruptcy cost is the difficulty to 
keep and recruit new talents and high performing managers (Sharpe, 1995). This latter trend 
may rise and become clearer if the financial situation does not improve. 
The lack of competitive advantages and financial distress imply that Norske Skog will 
continue to struggle in the industry. Sooner or later the company will run out of non-core 
assets to sell and future deficits will put upwards pressure on the costs of refinancing. 
However, the Merger Endgame framework implies that the Paper industry will continue to 
consolidate in the Focus Stage but at a slower speed. It is therefore highly uncertain when a 
consolidation in the future will drive up the newsprint and/or magazine paper prices. 
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Another option is to find a partner to consolidate. However, despite the fact that the 
underlying business is generating cash, as shown in table 4.12, Norske Skog is not seen as a 
good acquisition target. It is classified as an underperformer involved in the unattractive 
newsprint and magazine segments. Regularly investments in maintenance of machinery and 
operational fixed assets are also required for the paper mills, as shown in table 4.13. 
CFS 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Cash generated from operations 28,905 27,238 26,639 21,144 18,920 
Cash used in operations -24,608 - 23,547 -23,574 -18,734 -18,070 
= 4,297 3,691 3,065 2,410 850 
Cash from net financial items -1,365 -1,011 -727 -548 -520 
Taxes paid -169 - 514 -361 -166 67 
Net cash from operating activities 2,763 2,166 1,977 1,697 397 
  Table 4.12: Cash from operating activities in million NOK (Norske Skog, A2010).  
CFS 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Purchase/Investments in  
operational fixed assets 
-1,722 -1,746 -1,283 -580 -411 
  Table 4.13: Cash for maintenance in million NOK (Norske Skog, A2010).  
Porter’s five forces imply that newcomers will not invest in the newsprint segment in mature 
markets due to unattractive growth prospects. For the same reason it is unlikely that a 
potential partner is not already involved in the newsprint and/or magazine segments. The 
critical question for a potential partner or acquirer is if the discounted future cash flow 
(adjusted for maintenance) from the ongoing paper machines plus economies of scale or 
operational synergies exceed the liquation value. A possible acquisition premium must also be 
taken into account. Since the cash flow from operations is low in Europe due to oversupply 
and the fact that the acquisition offer modest economies of scale and operational synergies the 
chance is large that a company that is already heavily involved in newsprint and/or magazine 
paper in Europe might find the buy to liquidate alternative the most attractive.  
Norske Skog’s capacity within newsprint is 1.58 million tonnes and 1.54 million within 
magazine paper in Europe. In 2010 it had 14 % of the total newsprint capacity, 12 % of the 
total uncoated magazine paper capacity and 7 % of the total coated magazine paper capacity 
in Western-Europe. The control over the capacity enables a significant impact on the supply 
side of newsprint and magazine paper in Europe. As the European region is struggling with 
oversupply the best option is to close down capacity in order to increase prices.  
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In a takeover the acquirer will upgrade his assets portfolio in Europe to stay competitive. 
Excess capacity is scrapped, moved to regions where the supply and demand sides are more 
balanced or sold to companies outside Europe. These alternatives depend on the age of the 
equipment. In general potential upgrades of old equipment have shown costly. In 2006, 
Norske Skog decided to move one of the used paper machines at the discontinued mill Union 
in Skien to Pisa in Brazil (Norske Skog, A2006). The machine needed to be upgraded and the 
project had an original cost limit of 210 million. The machine was never put into use due to 
cost overruns. The latter option of selling assets to companies outside Europe also relies on 
the acquirer’s position in other regions as the acquirer will avoid putting downwards pressure 
on prices in other regions where it operates.  
The sell to liquidate alternative has several implications. The companies within newsprint and 
magazine paper in Europe that are not involved in the merger or acquisition will become free-
riders that will benefit from the price increase. For this reason the alternative can only pay-off 
for the companies with the largest newsprint and/or magazine capacity in Europe. Another 
implication is found in the Porter’s five forces analysis: when the prices become attractive 
there is a threat that established companies re-open idle paper machines or invest in new 
capacity, and thereby triggering a new cycle of oversupply. There are no guaranties. 
Potential partners are involved in newsprint and magazine paper in Europe. Ranked by total 
magazine and newsprint capacity in West-Europe they are UPM, Stora Enso, Holmen, Burgo, 
SAPPI, Palm and SCA. UPM and Stora Enso are large in newsprint, coated and uncoated. 
Holmen is present in newsprint and uncoated. The remaining companies are involved in only 
one of the three with moderate shares. Given the free-rider incentive it seems unlikely that 
other than UPM, Stora Enso and Holmen will take on Norske Skog by themselves. 
UPM, Stora Enso and Holmen are product diversified and are not experiencing financial 
distress. However, it seems unlikely that UPM has the capacity to take on a new acquisition 
targets in the near future. The company will use EUR 100-150 million to integrate Myllykoski 
that it acquired for EUR 100 million in equity and EUR 800 million in long-term debt late in 
2010 (UPM, Q1 2011). As of April 2011 UPM has a gearing of 0.44. Stora Enso and Holmen 
have year-end 2010 gearings of 0.41 and 0.34 accordingly. It is also possible with a potential 
collaboration between several companies in a takeover. In September 2010 a Finnish 
newspaper claimed that Stora Enso, Norske Skog and Holmen were planning to merge 
(Blokhus, 2010). This was however not confirmed by any of the companies involved. 
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The acquisition of Norske Skog also involves assets located in other regions than Europe. 
Based on the company’s competitiveness and strategic positioning the operations in South-
America and Oceania are assumed attractive while the operations in Asia less attractive. 
In the perspective of the stockholders the best solution is to seek a partner to merge with or 
get acquired. However, there are strict limitations of potential partners and the sale to 
liquidate option threatens the CEO’s position and creates incentive to continue operations. 
4.2.9 Conclusion and strategic overview 
The Merger Endgame framework implies that the Paper industry will continue to consolidate 
in the Focus Stage but at a slower speed. This has several implications for Norske Skog. 
Norske Skog is facing financial distress, operates in a segment threatened by overcapacity in 
Europe, and has few competitive advantages. The financial distress limits the company’s 
ability to invest in new market opportunities or assess acquisition targets on its own. It seems 
capable to refinance within 2012 but there is a substantial possibility of default in the future.  
Norske Skog has the choice of continued operations or to sell to liquidate. From the 
perspective of the stockholders the option to continue operations is risky. In the case of a 
bankruptcy there is uncertainty regarding the value of the assets. This option relies on a 
consolidation in the near future that drives up the prices as the demand in Europe is not 
expected to increase. A consolidation is not unlikely according to the Endgame Framework 
but the indication of decreasing speed of consolidation makes it highly uncertain. 
From the perspective of the stockholders the sell to liquidate is the greatest value creation 
opportunity. Norske Skog is however not considered an attractive acquisition target and the 
potential acquirers are limited to UPM, Stora Enso, Holmen, Burgo, SAPPI, Palm and SCA 
that will gain on limiting the overcapacity problem within newsprint and magazine paper in 
Europe. Potential candidates may prefer to wait and speculate that Norske Skog goes bankrupt 
due to the free-rider problem and threat of returning overcapacity as they are product 
diversified and can carry losses in the newsprint and magazine segments. Moreover, the sale 
to liquidate option threatens the CEO’s position and creates incentive to continue operations. 
The future of Norske Skog is highly uncertain and depends on several factors that the 
company cannot control. If neither a partner is found nor a consolidation within the newsprint 
and/or magazine segments occurs, there is a severe risk of bankruptcy in the future.  
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5. Evaluation of the Merger Endgame framework 
In this section the Merger Endgame framework is evaluated in general and in the cases of 
Norsk Hydro and Norske Skog. Strength and weaknesses are addressed. 
The Merger Endgame framework’s main strength is its potential to make the Porter’s five 
forces analysis more dynamic. The work of Porter (1980, 1985) has been widely criticized, 
mainly for being too static (Mintzberg et al., 1998; Kim and Mauborgne, 2004, and Gilbert 
and Strebel, 1988). By combining the Merger Endgame framework with the Porter’s five 
forces it becomes clearer where the industry is headed, and as the industry continues to 
consolidate and moves up the s-curve the internal rivalry will change. However, specific 
changes will rely on the industry’s fundamentals and should be treated individually.  
The Merger Endgame framework’s main weakness is the uncertainty regarding the 
correctness and precision of the framework. Especially the time x-axis is difficult to use in 
practice due to a high uncertainty regarding the correctness of it. The framework’s credibility 
will also gain on independent backing or proof in the academic world. 
In the cases of Norsk Hydro and Norske Skog several strengths were revealed. In both cases 
the conclusion of the Porter’s fives forces fit with the profitability outlined by the framework.  
The CR3 estimates from the framework were also used to describe the customer power in both 
cases, giving the Porter’s five forces analysis a more dynamic fundament. However, this goes 
both ways as both cases illustrate that the framework will have little practical use without 
other frameworks that address the industry’s fundamentals, such as Porter and PESTEL. 
In the cases of Norsk Hydro and Norske Skog some weaknesses and practical pitfalls were 
revealed. In both cases it was difficult to state any estimates on time intervals, for example 
when a consolidation will happen within the Paper industry. As a consequence the time x-axis 
was of little use. In the case of Norsk Hydro it was difficult to define the industry as it 
consisted of two unrelated streams, up/midstream and downstream. The definition of 
industries is critical as it effects the position on the s-curve. In the case of Norske Skog the 
framework’s paradox is revealed: the framework is deterministic but at the same time the 
companies can choose not to consolidate and thereby changing the shape of the s-curve by 
expanding the time x-axis. This observation undermines the accuracy of the time x-axis.  
In general the Merger Endgame has the potential to make Porter’s five forces (and related 
frameworks’) analysis more dynamic. My use of the two case-examples Norsk Hydro and 
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Norske Skog shows that these two frameworks are good supplements and provide a forward-
looking element to the analysis. Nonetheless, there are still uncertainties regarding the 
correctness and precision of the Merger Endgame framework. Further empirical research is 
therefore needed to evaluate the framework and improve its empirical foundation. 
6. Conclusion 
The development of the Aluminum and Paper industry was assessed by A.T. Kearney’s 
Merger Endgame framework. The implications for Norsk Hydro and Norske Skog were also 
addressed along with value creation opportunities for the corresponding stockholders.  
The framework reveals that up/midstream in the Aluminum industry is entering the Balance 
and Alliance Stage while downstream is deconsolidating. Norsk Hydro has invested heavily in 
up/midstream and is well positioned to face the increasing reliance on joint ventures and 
cooperation in the Balance and Alliance Stage. However, the expansion in up/midstream and 
increasing rivalry downstream imply that the management does not have the capacity to build 
top performers within both business areas which rely on different skills. The greatest value 
creation opportunity for the stockholders is therefore to further demerge downstream 
operations to secure operational mobility and responsiveness to shifting market conditions.  
The Merger Endgame framework reveals that the Paper industry has entered the Focus Stage. 
Financial distress and unsustainable prices in Europe are limiting Norske Skog’s ability to 
invest in value creation opportunities or assess acquisition targets on its own. Further 
consolidation in Europe might limit the current overcapacity problem but the Merger 
Endgame reveals that the consolidation speed is decreasing. From the perspective of the 
stockholders the greatest value creation opportunity is therefore to sell to liquidate. However, 
Norske Skog is not considered an attractive acquisition target and potential acquirers are 
limited. Due to the free-rider problem and threat of returning overcapacity some candidates 
may prefer to wait and speculate that Norske Skog goes bankrupt. If neither a partner is found 
nor a consolidation occurs, there is a severe risk of bankruptcy in the future for Norske Skog. 
Empirical research is needed to evaluate the correctness and precision of the Merger Endgame 
framework as there are several weaknesses in its empirical foundation. The major weaknesses 
are the dataset’s short time span of ten years and that it coincides with the stock market boom. 
As a consequence the results drawn may not reflect normal market and industry conditions. 
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The Merger Endgame framework’s main strength is its potential to make Porter’s five forces 
analysis more dynamic. The main weakness is the uncertainty regarding the correctness and 
precision of the framework. Especially the uncertainty regarding the correctness of the time x-
axis makes it difficult to use in practice. A final observation is the deterministic aspect of the 
framework, as companies can choose not to consolidate and thereby changing the shape of the 
s-curve by expanding the time x-axis. Or in the words of Morpheus from the Matrix (1999): 
“… there is a difference between knowing the path and walking the path”13. 
 
  
                                                           
13
 The Matrix is a science fiction movie from 1999.  
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APPENDIX 
A.1 Industries ranked by consolidation level (1995- 1999) 
Industries ranked by the average HHI for 1995- 1999 is shown in figure A.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.1: Important Industries ranked by the average HHI for 1995- 1999. 
A.2 Supply and demand by nations in the Aluminum industry 
 
Figure A.2.1: Producers of bauxite (Mineralsuk, 20.2.11). 
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Figure A.2.2: Producers of alumina (Mineralsuk, 20.2.11). 
 
 
(continues on the next page.) 
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Figure A.2.3: Producers of primary aluminum (Mineralsuk, 20.2.11). 
A.3 Calculations related to the Aluminum industry 
The companies from the Aluminum industry listed in table A3.1 are analyzed based on A.T. 
Kearney’s research from 2007, Yahoo finance’s Aluminum industry list February 2011 and 
Norsk Hydro’s annual reports. BHP Billiton was excluded due to less than 8 % of revenues 
from aluminum in 2009 (BHP, A2009). 
Name Ticker Type Analyzed 
Alcoa Inc AAI.AX, AA Fully integrated Yes 
ALUAR ALUMINO 
ARGENTIONO 
ALUA.BA Specialized: Mid and downstream Yes 
Alumina Ltd AWC.AX Specialized: Up- and midstream (Alcoa owns 
60% of JV. Managed by Alcoa.) 
- 
Aluminum Corp of China ACH Fully integrated Yes 
Alba ALBH Specialized: Mainly smelting Yes  
BHP Billiton BHP Fully integrated No. Less than 8 
% of revenues 
from aluminum. 
Dubal - Specialized: Mainly smelting Yes  
Shangdong Nanshan SHA Specialized: Downstream Yes 
Henan Zhongfu Ind 600595 Specialized: Downstream Yes 
Yunnan Aluminum 000807 Specialized: Mainly smelting Yes 
Bhoruka Aluminium Ltd BHRKALM.BO Specialized: Downstream Yes 
BHP Billiton BHP Specialized: Up and midstream -  
Capral Ltd CAA.AX Specialized: Downstream Yes 
Century Aluminum Co  CENX Fully integrated Yes 
Century Extrusions Ltd CENTEXT.NS & CENTEXTR.BO Specialized: Downstream Yes 
Alicon Castalloy Ltd ENKEICAQ.BO Specialized: Downstream Yes 
ESS DEE Aluminum Ltd ESSDEE.NS Specialized: Downstream (Packaging) Yes 
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(Merged with India Foils) 
Gujarat Foils Ltd  GUJFOIL.BO  Specialized: Downstream Yes 
Hindalco Industries Ltd HINDALCO.BO, HINDALCO.NS Fully integrated Yes 
Kaiser Aluminum Corp KALU Fully integrated Yes 
Maan Aluminum Ltd MANALU.NS, MANALUM.BO Specialized: Downstream Yes 
Manaksia Ltd MANAKSIA.BO Specialized: Downstream Yes 
National Aluminum NALCO.BO, NATIONALU.NS Specialized: Up and midstream Yes 
Nirav Commercials Ltd NIRAVCOM.BO Specialized: Downstream Yes 
Noranda Aluminum 
Holding 
NAF.DE, NOR Fully integrated Yes 
Norsk Hydro ASA NHY.L, NOH1.DE Fully integrated Yes 
Sacheta Metals Ltd SACHEMT.BO Specialized: Downstream Yes 
Sims Metal Management 
Limited 
SMS Specialized: Midstream (Remelting) Yes 
Sudal Industries Ltd SUDAI.BO Specialized: Downstream Yes 
United Anodisers NV UAS.PA Specialized: Downstream Yes 
United Company Rusal 
PLC 
R6I.DE, RUAL.PA, RUSAL.PA Fully integrated Yes 
Rio Tinto Alcan RIO Fully integrated Yes 
Table A.3.1: Companies analyzed in the Aluminum industry. 
The data used to calculate the CR3 for the s-curve and the CAGR 2006 – 2010 is listed below. 
Figures not in U.S. dollars were converted by the current exchange rate. The companies 
marked in blue are specialized in downstream.  
Company Alcoa Aluar Corp of China Bhoruka BHP Capral Century Al Century Ex 
(million USD) 
Adjusted market cap 
2010 15851,6233 1672,31 12261,02 4,8 0 58,185 1441,184 19,2 
2006 26561,5214 1227,6 10383,04 0,855 0 296,808 1451,125 2,82 
CAGR Growth -0,12106816 0,080351245 0,042438682 0,53928409 0 -0,33459837 -0,00171705 0,615336588 
Revenue 
2010 21013 966 18470 30,8 0 235 1169,27 27,19 
2006 30379 495 9896 19,6 0 493 1558,57 18,5 
CAGR Growth -0,088034 0,181933336 0,168831217 0,119627769 0 -0,16908761 -0,06932698 0,101055903 
EBIT 
2010 1030 208 523 2,5 0 4,39 103 2,45 
2006 3740 174 2647 1,55 0 -9 309 0,92 
EBIT/REV10 0,04901728 0,215320911 0,028316188 0,081168831 0 0,018680851 0,08808915 0,090106657 
EBIT/REV06 0,12311136 0,351515152 0,267481811 0,079081633 0 -0,01825558 0,19825866 0,04972973 
 
Alicon Castalloy ESS DEE Gujarat Foils Hindalco Kaiser Maan Manaksia National Nirav 
29,04 251,59 10,004 7653,6 654,72 3,2448 136,915 5798,7 3,666 
16,75 42,75 0,637 4440,119 796,22 2,5012 24,48 4252,38 8,58 
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0,14748086 0,557540377 0,990712588 0,14582367 -0,0477398 0,067234555 0,537835579 0,080624086 -0,19150695 
52,81 131,05 30,5 4339 1079 15,3 196,6 1208 1,6 
27,19 15,77 19,5 2531 1357 8,91 228 1196,4 3,6 
0,180529217 0,697857874 0,118320554 0,1442591 -0,05569911 0,144730968 -0,03636589 0,002415175 -0,18350342 
5,37 28,4 1,72 491,4 44,4 0,53 17,5 266 0,1 
3,71 34,15 4 494 3191 0,74 13,5 539 0,12 
0,101685287 0,216711179 0,056393443 0,1132519 0,04114921 0,034640523 0,089013225 0,220198675 0,0625 
0,136447223 2,165504122 0,205128205 0,19517977 2,35151069 0,08305275 0,059210526 0,450518221 0,033333333 
 
Noranda Norsk Hydro Sacheta Sims Sudal 
United 
Andodisers UC Rusal 
Rio Tinto 
Alcan Alba 
975,28 11575,2 2,1303 2851,92 5 10,4994 23100 139231 3369,9 
475,2 11621,79 0,9937 2386,56 0,88 30,2917 10264 82303 2531 
0,196914757 -0,00100372 0,210030645 0,04554143 0,543909477 -0,23270882 0,22482441 0,14046003 0,07419028 
1294,9 13612,61 9,93 6299,8 16,86 33,26 14000 56576 1997 
1312,72 31515,18 5,18 3752 11,5 29,25 11740 46065 1500 
-0,00341113 -0,1893089 0,176670518 0,13832424 0,100373018 0,032640356 0,04499686 0,052725859 0,07416674 
67,4 591 0,29 194,5 1,97 1,79 2167 19235 500 
205,9 9306 0,64 186,4 0,84 1,71 1761 17000 340 
0,052050351 0,04341563 0,029204431 0,030874 0,116844603 0,0538184 0,15478571 0,339985153 0,25037556 
0,156849899 0,29528627 0,123552124 0,04968017 0,073043478 0,058461538 0,15 0,369043743 0,22666667 
 
Dubal Shangdong Henan Zhongfu Yunnan Aluminum Total 
14630 2812 3165 2159,4 249737,132 
4043 675 523,16 515,31 164878,372 
0,37922508 0,42865671 0,568320415 0,430757831 0,10937879 
8670 1380 957 809 154621,48 
2396 360 462 1033 148428,87 
0,37921849 0,39924623 0,199685723 -0,059276377 0,01027094 
817 133 123 47 26607,71 
226 47 54 86 40359,18 
0,09423299 0,09637681 0,128526646 0,058096415 0,17208288 
0,09432387 0,13055556 0,116883117 0,083252662 0,27190923 
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The CARG portfolio along with revenues and operating margins can be taken directly from 
the calculations listed above. The CR3 is found by taken the three largest companies by 
revenues each year divided by the industry’s total amount of revenues. For example in 2006 
the three largest were Alcoa, Norsk Hydro and Rio Tinto Alcan: (30,379 + 31,515.18 + 
46,065)/148,428.87 that equals 72.7 %. It is possible to exclude downstream (marked in blue) 
in these calculations, as done in the paper. 
A.4 Calculations related to the Paper industry 
The companies in the Paper industry listed in table A.4.1 are analyzed based on A.T. 
Kearney’s research from 2003 and Norske Skog’s annual reports. White Brick is excluded 
due to bankruptcy and several companies have no figures published. Estimated means that 
adjusted market value is retrieved by the industry average’s price-to-earnings ratio P/E. 
Name Ticker Segments Analyzed 
CSS NYSE: CSS Household goods. Specialized in greeting cards. Yes 
Norbord TSX: NBD Mainly wood products. Yes 
Fibria Celulose NYSE: FBR Mainly pulp. Yes 
Domtar TSX & NYSE: UFS Pulp, wood products and household goods. Yes 
SCA OMX: SCA B Pulp, wood products, household goods and fine 
paper. Newsprint and magazine segment. 
Yes  
DS Smith LSE: SMDS Packaging and fine paper for the office. Yes  
Sappi NYSE: SPP Wood products, pulp and fine paper. Magazine 
paper. 
Yes 
AbiBow TSX: ABH Wood products, pulp and fine paper. Newsprint 
and magazine segment. 
Yes. Bankruptcy 
reorganization in 
2009. Estimated. 
Nippon Paper JP 3893 Wood products, pulp, packaging and fine paper. 
Newsprint and magazine segment. 
Yes 
NewPage Private Newsprint and magazine segment. Yes 
White Brich - Did serve newsprint and magazine segment. No. Filed for 
bankruptcy 
reorganization in 
2010. 
Kruger Private Packaging, household goods and wood products. 
Newsprint and magazine segment. 
No. No data. 
Catalyst  TSX: CTL Fine paper. Newsprint and magazine segment. Yes 
Burgo Private Magazine paper, fine paper, printing and 
household goods. 
Yes. Estimated 
Palm Private Newsprint. No. No data. 
International Paper  NYSE: IP Fine paper, household goods and packaging. Yes 
Potlach NASDAQ: PCH Wood products. Yes 
Officemax NYSE: OMX Fine paper for the office. Yes 
West Fraser TSX: WFT Wood products. Yes 
M-Real OMX: MRLBV Pulp and packaging. Yes 
95 
 
UPM/Myllykoski OMX: UMPV1 Wood products, pulp and fine paper. Newsprint 
and magazine segment. 
Yes 
Stora Enso OMX: STERV Packaging, wood products, pulp and fine paper. 
Newsprint and magazine segment. 
Yes 
Kimberly-Clark NYSE: KMB Household goods. Yes 
Georgia Pacific Part of conglomerate Koch 
Industries 
Pulp, household goods, packaging, and wood 
products. 
No. No data. 
Unicharm TYO: 8113 Household goods. Yes 
OJI Paper TYO: 3861 Packaging and fine paper. Serves newsprint and 
magazine segment. 
Yes 
Holmen OMX: HOLM B Newsprint and magazine segment. Yes 
Norske Skog OSE: NSG Newsprint and magazine segment. Yes 
Carter Holt Harvey Private Wood products, pulp and packaging. No. No data. 
Table A.4.1: Companies analyzed in the Paper industry. 
The data used to calculate the CR3 for the s-curve and the CAGR 2006 – 2010 is listed below. 
Figures not in U.S. dollars were converted by the current exchange rate. The companies 
marked in blue are involved in newsprint and/or magazine paper.  
Company CSS Norbord Fibria Celulose Domtar SCA DS Smith Sappi AbiBow 
(million USD) 
       
Adjusted market cap 
2010 182,845 636,84 7488 3209,68 1755,75 91424,5 2692,564 2295,99 
2006 303,135 1156,32 3060 2026,5 1683,36 95091,2 4223,31 1875 
CAGR Growth -0,11872439 -0,13853413 0,250722902 0,12183447 0,01058167 
-
0,00978257 
-
0,10643064 0,05194293 
Revenue 
2010 448,45 892 4100 5850 17497 3375 6572 4746 
2006 525,5 1252 1317 3306 16262 2694 4941 3876 
CAGR Growth -0,03886293 -0,08126528 0,328310239 0,15335567 0,01846805 0,05795951 0,0739169 0,05192794 
EBIT 
2010 -31 20 767 448 1212 134 86 1682 
2006 32,72 114 299 -556 1095 40 -5 -400 
EBIT/REV10 -0,06912699 0,022421525 0,187073171 0,0765812 0,06926902 0,0397037 0,01308582 0,35440371 
EBIT/REV06 0,06226451 0,091054313 0,227031131 
-
0,16817907 0,06733489 0,01484781 
-
0,00101194 
-
0,10319917 
 
Nippon Paper NewPage WhiteBirch Catalyst Burgo Palm 
International 
Paper Potlach 
Bankrupt No data 
3016 1740 0 95,5 92969 0 11848,539 1284,4 
5335 986 0 797,65 88648 0 13514,3 1098,04 
-0,13288993 0,15257205 0 -0,41176921 0,01196922 0 -0,03235109 0,03996934 
13283 3596 0 1283 3432 0 25179 539,45 
9959 2038 0 1967 3272,5 0 21995 417,24 
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0,07465759 0,15253434 0 -0,10131897 0,01196829 0 0,03437646 0,06632923 
497 86,3 0 -433 40 0 822 44,87 
378 110 0 -71,5 101 0 3188 79,47 
0,03741625 0,02399889 0 -0,33749026 0,01165501 0 0,03264625 0,08317731 
0,03795562 0,05397448 0 -0,03634977 0,03086325 0 0,14494203 0,19046592 
 
Officemax West Fraser M-Real UPM/Myllykoski Stora Enso Kimberly-Clark 
Georgia 
Pacific Uni Charm 
No data  
1506,27 1999,188 1190,64 7540 8032,02 25384,59 0 7560 
3535,28 1688,46 2278 11250,95 10840,86 26265,6 0 5413,52 
-0,19207741 0,04313547 -0,14973033 -0,0952147 -0,07223014 -0,00849318 0 0,08707751 
7150 2885,9 3726 12763 14727 19746 0 4328 
8965 3325,84 5289 14333 16391 16747 0 3279 
-0,05498449 -0,03484963 -0,08384845 -0,02858699 -0,02640752 0,04204273 0 0,07185604 
115,74 238,6 209 908 1324 2550 0 533 
171,88 522,28 -246 525 992 1845 0 347 
0,01618741 0,08267785 0,05609232 0,07114315 0,0899029 0,12914008 0 0,12315157 
0,01917234 0,15703702 -0,04651163 0,03662876 0,06052102 0,11016899 0 0,10582495 
 
OJI Paper Holmen Norske Skog Total 
    
4734,436 3074,4 489,328 282150,48 
6083,58 4053,44 3196,179 294403,684 
-0,06075854 -0,06677975 -0,374478497 -0,010571563 
13915 2800 3522 176355,8 
14723 2961 5345 165181,08 
-0,01401178 -0,01387968 -0,099029834 0,01649995 
450 221 -452 11472,51 
475 327,2 -480 8884,05 
0,0323392 0,07892857 -0,128336173 0,065053205 
0,03226245 0,11050321 -0,089803555 0,053783702 
 
The CAGR portfolio 2006 – 2010 along with revenues and operating margins can be taken 
directly from the calculations listed above. The CR3 is found by taken the three largest 
companies by revenues each year divided by the industry’s total amount of revenues. A.3 
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provides an example of this. It is possible to exclude those companies not involved in 
newsprint and/or magazine paper (marked in black) in these calculations, as done in the paper. 
